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In an age of privatization of many governmental functions such as health care, 
prison management, and warfare, this Article poses the question as to whether eminent 
domain should be among them.  Unlike other privatized functions, eminent domain is a 
traditionally governmental and highly coercive power, akin to the government’s power to 
tax, to arrest individuals, and to license.  It is, therefore, a very public power.   
In particular, the delegation of this very public power to private, non-profit and 
charitable corporations has escaped the scrutiny that for-profit private actors have 
attracted in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. Though delegated 
the very public power of eminent domain, these private, non-profit actors may only be 
accountable to their private boards of directors instead of to the general electorate.   
This Article asserts that the largely procedural due process underpinnings of the 
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD), a doctrine that has enjoyed renewed vigor in 
the state courts, provides an excellent means to assess the delegation of the takings power 
to private, non-profit corporations.  The paper introduces two PNDD tests and applies 
these tests to two case studies in which eminent domain power has been delegated to 
private non-profits.  Finally, in order to address the procedural due process concerns 
stressed by the PNDD and the two judicial tests, this Article proposes seven legislative 
solutions, including the use of Social Capital Impact Assessments, for state legislatures 
that have either delegated the takings power to private, non-profits, or that are 
contemplating these delegations.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
It is no secret that federal and state governments increasingly contract out a 
number of responsibilities and functions to private parties, from prison management2 to 
health care3 to warfare.4 It is fathomable that almost any governmental function could be 
outsourced to a private party.5 However, should eminent domain, often viewed as the 
most public of powers,6 be among them?   
This question fundamentally arises in the context in the delegation of the takings 
power to private, non-profit or charitable corporations that may be accountable to no one 
but a board of directors and private donors, and least of all the general electorate.   In the 
 
1 The author is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas 
Southern University.  J.D., 2000, Cornell Law School; A.B. cum laude, 1995 Harvard College. The author 
would like to thank Fabiola Cagigal-Acciarri for her invaluable research and editorial assistance.  In addition, the 
author is indebted to Professors Tom Kleven and Walter Champion, J’Antae D. Hall, Timothy L. Johnson, and 
the participants of the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, 
especially to Professor Linda R. Crane, for her helpful commentary.      
2 See David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference:  Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 
YALE L.J. 815, 818 (1987) (“Private for-profit firms now operate approximately two dozen major facilities, 
including at least three medium or maximum security adult correctional institutions.”); see also Ira P. 
Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L.REV. 911, 911-12 
(1988) (noting that prison overcrowding is “pervasive” and that privatizing correctional facilities has been 
proposed to reduce the overcrowding problem).    
3 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543, 552 (2000) (stating 
that “[i]n the last half century, the private nonprofit sector has become the primary mechanism for 
delivering government-financed human services, such as health care.”).   In addition, the article goes on to 
note that outside of health care, local governments have also contracted out their waste management and 
highway construction services. Id. 
4 Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29. ("Private gunmen . . . are now 
guarding four U.S. generals . . . . [a]nd throughout Iraq, the defense of essential military sites like depots of 
captured munitions has been informally shared by private soldiers and U.S. troops. If the 25,000 figure is 
accurate, the [private] businesses add about 16 percent to the coalition's total forces."). 
5 David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 647-48 (1986) (noting 
that “almost any power or function exercised by a government, particularly a state or local government, can 
also be exercised, unremarked, by some clearly private actor.”). 
6 See id. at 648 (“Accepting some fuzziness at the edges, we do recognize certain powers as essentially 
governmental:  rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, licensing and taxation.  
These powers share the element of coercion, of making someone do something he does not choose to do or 
preventing him from doing what he wishes to do.”) (emphasis added); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on 
Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L.REV. 561, 586 (1947) (“It is when delegated power 
affects the use of real property or the practice of a profession that the judicial nerve tingles.”).  
5wake of Kelo v. City of New London,7 for-profit private entities have garnered the most 
attention from legislators and the public, given the benefits that may accrue to them when 
government uses takings as part of an “integrated”8 or “comprehensive”9 economic 
development plan.  These plans may provide revenue expansion to for-profit 
corporations, but also to the public in the form of increased property and sales tax 
revenues and additional jobs.  Despite all the attention that Kelo generated towards the 
part played by for-profit corporations in the eminent domain arena, private non-profit and 
charitable corporations that have been delegated the takings power by state legislatures, 
have managed to slip under the public’s and lawmakers’ eminent domain radar screen.  
These non-profit entities have evaded the sort of scrutiny and detection that not only 
government, but also private for-profit corporations, that may exercise significant 
influence upon government in takings,10 have historically attracted as a matter of course.   
As a preliminary matter, this Article will use the term “private, non-profit 
corporations” as a global term for non-profit and charitable corporations, as well as for 
charitable organizations and urban redevelopment corporations.  The common link in the 
nomenclature is that these corporations are largely organized for a purpose outside of 
 
7 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).  Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  Justice O’Connor authored a dissenting opinion in 
which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined.  Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and 
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion.   
8 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.   
9 Id. at 2668. 
10 See, e.g., regarding Kelo and the residents in New London, Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort 
Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1, Jane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire You’re a Scholar and a Visionary....If 
Only You Could Quit Leaving Skin on the Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5.; see also Barry 
Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP Magazine Online, Nov. 3, 2005, 
http://www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose _house_is_it_anyway.html.   (discussing the outcry against the 
City of New London and Pfizer Corporation upon the city’s decision to use eminent domain to acquire 
parcels of land in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood).  Another infamous example is found in Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take 
statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General 
Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were 
substantial); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground:  Using Eminent Domain for 
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1868 (2005) (discussing that residents in Poletown banded 
together to form the Poletown Neighborhood Council to contest the takings and noting that, in Kelo, property 
owners who opposed the takings organized to file a lawsuit). 
6engendering profits for shareholders.  Their purpose is geared towards charitable or 
benevolent aims.11 Secondly, these corporations are largely entitled to favorable tax 
treatment.12 
This paper will also assert that the largely procedural due process underpinnings 
of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD) may be used to assess the delegation of 
eminent domain power to non-profit and charitable corporations by state legislatures.  
The PNDD has enjoyed renewed vigor in the state courts after having been last used by 
the Court in the New Deal era and remaining essentially dormant in the federal courts 
since that time.  Further, by using PNDD analysis to examine the statutory controls and 
legislative delegations in two case studies, in which states have delegated the takings 
power to non-profit and charitable corporations, this paper will also propose seven 
statutory procedural due process mechanisms for use by states that have delegated, or are 
contemplating delegating, the takings power with little or no accountability controls or 
safeguards.   
Accordingly, Part II of this Article will explain the PNDD and the Doctrine’s 
nexus to eminent domain.  Part III will then examine the rationales for the delegation of 
the takings power to non-profit and charitable corporations and arguments weighing 
against those delegations.  Part III will also discuss the principles supporting and 
disfavoring the wholesale abolishment of the delegation of eminent domain power to 
private, non-profit and charitable corporations.  Part IV of this Article will explore 
 
11 For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a non-profit corporation as “a corporation organized for 
some purpose other than making a profit, and usually afforded special  tax treatment—[a]lso termed not-
for-profit corporation.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 343 (7th Ed. 1999).  In addition, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines a charitable corporation as “[a] nonprofit corporation that is dedicated to benevolent purposes and 
thus entitled to special tax status under the Internal Revenue Code—[a]lso termed eleemosynary 
corporation.”  Id. Finally, the same source describes a charitable organization as a “[a] tax-exempt 
organization that (1) is organized and operated exclusively for religious, scientific, literary, educational, 
athletic, public-safety, or community-service purposes, (2) does not distribute earnings for the benefit of 
private individuals, and (3)  does not participate in any political candidate campaigns, or engage in 
substantial lobbying.” (citing Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)). Id. 
12 See id. 
7notions of procedural due process as applied to the delegation of the takings power to 
private, non-profit corporations and assess arguments favoring the use of these due 
process principles in this area.  Part IV will similarly introduce two PNDD tests largely 
derived from procedural due process, and it will consider a substantive due process 
approach to the private delegation of the takings power to non-profit corporations.  Part V 
will then present the two case studies and apply the PNDD tests to each.  Part VI will 
propose the seven legislative solutions, including Social Capital Impact Assessments 
(SCIAs), that may be used to address any procedural due process failings of private 
delegations of the public takings power.  Part VII will conclude this paper.   
II. The Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD) 
 A. History 
 
In the federal courts, the general Non-Delegation Doctrine enjoyed a vibrant but 
brief renaissance from 1935 to 1936 when in three cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invoked the Doctrine to strike down federal legislation that had delegated power to 
federal agencies and to private parties.13 In instances where power had been delegated to 
federal agencies, the Public Non-Delegation Doctrine was invoked, while instances 
concerning delegation of power to private parties referenced the Private Non-Delegation 
Doctrine.14 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate delegations on 
 
13 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a portion of the National Industry Recovery 
Act that delegated to the Executive the power to enact codes of fair competition in the petroleum and 
petroleum products industry in an effort to help the industry recover from the Great Depression), A.L.A. 
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down Congress’ delegation of power 
to the Executive pursuant to the National Industry Recovery Act to regulate working hours, minimum pay, 
and workplace standards in the live poultry industry in the New York City metropolitan area, also in an 
effort to revitalize this segment of the economy after hard economic times), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,  
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overturning the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that called for the 
delegation of power to private producers of coal that elected 23 boards to set minimum coal prices for each 
district and that also set pay rates and working hours for mining workers.  Coal producers that chose not to 
participate in the boards were subject to a 15 percent assessment on their sales of coal.).  
14 See id. 
8Doctrine grounds, 15 and the federal appellate and district courts have generally followed 
suit.16 While there is an argument that the Non-Delegation Doctrine might be a dead-
letter at the federal level,17 many commentators have noted that there is still yet hope, as 
the Court has not yet rejected it outright.18 For example, the Doctrine occasionally 
receives approving nods of attention in various Court opinions.19 In contrast, however, 
 
15 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1982) (noting that Panama Ref. Co., Schecter, and Carter Coal proved to be “the 
Supreme Court’s last and only applications of the doctrine to overturn congressional acts.”); see also A. 
Michael Froomkin, Thirtieth Annual Administrative Law Issue Governance of the Internet:  Article Wrong 
Turn in Cyberspace:  Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 155 
(2000) (“But while the Supreme Court has had no modern opportunities to revisit the private nondelegation 
doctrine . . . .”) and Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1127 (1977) (“Despite broad statements to this effect, however, the Supreme Court has never 
invalidated a congressional enactment on so sweeping a ground [the Non-Delegation Doctrine]-nor could it 
today without, in Professor Davis’ words, invalidating ‘approximately one hundred percent of federal 
legislation conferring rulemaking authority on federal agencies . . . .’”).     
16 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 648 (noting that, in reference to the PNDD, “[s]ince Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., decided a half-century ago, the federal courts have consistently allowed delegations of federal power 
to private actors.”). But see American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam) (noting that provisions of the Clean Air Act giving the Environmental Protection Agency the right 
to promulgate air quality standards nationwide was an unconstitutional delegation of power) (opinion 
modified on rehearing) (D.C. Cir. 1999).  Professor Cass Sunstein, however, notes that this decision by the 
D.C. Circuit represents the “birth of a new [public] nondelegation doctrine” in which agencies articulate 
specific “governing legal criteria” for the decisions they make.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act 
Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 310 (1999), and Industrial Union Department v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 684 (1980) (the “Benzene" case) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)  (writing 
that certain provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was an unconstitutional public delegation 
of power). 
17 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST 
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPERATE POWERS 20 (1999) (stating that “[t]he 
nondelegation doctrine is now moribund, although various law review articles try to breathe life into it 
every so often.”), Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (citing JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-33 (Harvard 1980) for the 
proposition that the nondelegation doctrine is “dead.”), and George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private 
Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 716 (1975) (referring to the Non-Delegation 
Doctrine as “nonsense”).  
18 See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155 (discussing, with respect to the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, 
that “there is reason to believe that Carter Coal’s fundamental limit on delegations of public power to 
private groups retains its validity.  Admittedly, the formal clues are sparse.  While never overturned, post-
Schecter Poultry Supreme Court commentary on Carter Coal is rare.”) (emphasis added); see also Aranson, 
supra note 15, at 12 (“Despite the Court’s reluctance to apply this ‘nondoctrine,’ it has refused to repudiate 
it completely.  Periodically, the nondelegation principle receives favorable mention in opinions of the Court 
and in those of individual justices. "); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 315-17 (stating that the Public Non-
Delegation Doctrine is “alive and well,” and lives on in the federal courts in a series of “canons of 
construction” that are easier for the federal courts to administer and are less unwieldy for them, but that 
equally reinforce traditional notions of representative democracy).      
19 See id. 
9the state courts have been fertile ground for overturning state legislation on Non-
Delegation Doctrine grounds.20 
B.  Judicial Reluctance and the Private Delegation of Public Power 
 
Courts find delegations of public power to private actors more problematic than 
delegations to public authorities or agencies, as there is less opportunity to hold private 
actors accountable at the ballot box for the choices they make with the power delegated 
to them.21 Indeed, in a New Deal case, Carter Coal, the Court overturned federal 
legislation that had delegated the power to regulate wages, working hours, and working 
conditions to certain coal producers.22 It noted that delegation to private persons “is 
legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an 
official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose 
interests may be and often are adverse to the interest of others in the same business.”23 
Other courts have noted, when considering delegations of power to private entities, that 
these delegations are more constitutionally “troubling” and, therefore, “are subject to 
more stringent requirements and less judicial deference than public delegations.”24 
Some scholars have noted that the underlying reason that delegation of public 
powers to private actors is more nettlesome to the judiciary is that there are some powers 
 
20 See e.g.,  Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155-56 (“But while the Supreme Court has had no modern 
opportunities to revisit the private nondelegation doctrine, the state courts have had that chance, and their 
treatment of the issue underlines the importance of the doctrine today.”), McGowan, supra note 15, at 1128 
(noting that the “nondelegation principle continues to have greater utility at the state level. . . .”), Texas 
Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1994) (overturning the Texas 
legislature’s creation of the “Official Cotton Growers’ Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation” that had the 
power to assess chargers on cotton producers on PNDD grounds), and FM Properties Operating Co. v. City 
of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (holding that certain portions of the Texas Water Code were 
unconstitutional because they delegated certain legislative powers related to water quality to landowners 
owning 1,000 acres or more).   
21 See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155 (“Several courts and commentators have agreed that delegations to 
private groups are more troubling than those to public agencies because the accountability mechanisms are 
weaker or non-existent.”). 
22 See supra note 13.  
23 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. 
24 FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 874. 
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that are “essentially governmental.”25 These public powers include “rulemaking, 
adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, and licensing and taxation.”26 The 
common denominator between them, however, is the “element of coercion.” 27 For 
instance, one who has these powers can force someone to do something that she does not 
wish to do; or conversely, that same entity can force an individual not to do something 
that she would like to do.28 
In contrast, power generally viewed as “private,” is centered squarely within the 
ability of an individual to consent to an action, and it is primarily found in contract law or 
in property ownership.29 For example, a private property owner may bar or permit others 
from entering her real property by caprice alone, and she may subject this admission to 
certain rules of her making.30 Moreover, by virtue of her being a real property owner, she 
may constrain the uses of real property in the surrounding area under nuisance law.31 In 
addition, the law of contracts gives private parties the right to define rules and regulations 
amongst themselves.32 
Therefore, because of the coercive nature of public, or traditionally governmental 
power, exemplified by a lack of consent to an action or decision by an affected 
individual, governments choose generally to outsource or to privatize “ministerial or 
mechanical functions” and non-coercive responsibilities.33 These services and functions 
frequently include the building of roads, waste collection, or the administration of health 
 
25 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 648. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1398, 1399 (1954). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 Suss v. American Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F.Supp. 181, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(holding that a business owner had standing to sue after officers of the American Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals, a private non-profit corporation delegated the authority by the New York legislature 
to enforce state laws protecting animals, broke through a wall without a warrant into the owner’s building 
to save a cat). 
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care.34 When coercive power that is traditionally exercised by government is exercised 
by private parties, it is, therefore, quite understandable that courts will scrutinize that 
power much more closely because of an increased risk of abuse and arbitrariness.35 
The judicial branch’s concern about the delegation of public power to private 
parties, however, is much more than academic.  Indeed, this concern has been borne out 
in the real world, as the way in which private delegates of public power have conducted 
themselves has proved historically “unsatisfactory.”36 
C.  PNDD’s Nexus to Eminent Domain 
 
Although traditionally the PNDD involved the delegation of purely legislative 
authority to private parties, the Doctrine, as applied to eminent domain, refers specifically 
to the delegation of the takings power by the legislature to private parties.37 Indeed, in 
 
34 See supra note 3. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. (citing W. Browne, Altgeld of Illinois ch. VIII-XIC (1924), and describing the conduct of private 
detectives who were deputized as police officers during the railway strike of 1984); see also Washington v. 
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928) (striking down an amendment to a zoning ordinance that required a 
landowner who wanted to build a retirement center for low-income elderly residents to obtain the written 
consent of  two-thirds of the landowners within 400 feet of the site because the consenting landowners “are 
not bound by any official duty but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may 
subject the trustee [the landowner desiring to build the home] to their will or caprice,” thereby violating the 
Due Process Clause); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District Committee, 352 A.2d 
634 (R.I. 1976) (holding that a Rhode Island statute that required public school districts to bus 
schoolchildren residing within the district’s boundaries to private schools unconstitutionally delegated 
legislative power to private schools, as they could establish how far a privately educated child could be 
bussed, regardless of whether the school was in the boundaries, and therefore how much the public school 
district would have to spend for these purposes); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 
1086, 1110-1111, 17 Cal.4th 553, 593 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., dissenting) (writing that the Unfair 
Competition Law in California that gave ordinary citizens, not just public prosecutors, standing to sue 
delegated public authority to prosecute to private citizens, thereby holding potential defendants arbitrarily 
hostage to self-interested “unelected, unaccountable private enforcers, unrestrained by established notions 
of concrete harm or public duty, [who] seek to advance their own agendas or deploy the law as leverage to 
increase attorney fees.”).   
37 See Benjamin McCorkle, Constitutional Law-Arkansas’s Nondelegation Doctrine:  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court Defines a Limit on the Delegation of Legislation Authority to a Private Party, Leathers v. 
Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc., 338 Ark. 425, 884 S.W.2d 481 (1999), 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 297, 299 
(2000) (“The nondelegation doctrine is the judicial interpretation of what authority a legislative body can 
delegate to another branch of government, administrative agencies, or non-governmental entities.”). 
12
the federal constitution38 and in many state constitutions, only government, irrespective 
of the branch, may exercise the power of eminent domain - within certain parameters.  
These parameters are generally that “just compensation” be paid to any property owner 
and that the taking must occur for a “public use.”39 
Nonetheless, as traditional governmental power goes, eminent domain ranks as 
one of the top.  It is essentially the power to seize real property using the power of 
coercion in lieu of consent,40 making it, for good reason, a very public power that is 
traditionally reserved to government. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Luxton v. North River Bridge 
Company that it is "beyond dispute" that Congress could constitutionally delegate the 
takings power to private, for-profit companies such as private railroad corporations.41 
These sorts of companies build railroads and bridges in order to further interstate 
commerce and economic growth by aiding transportation.42 However, it may be argued 
that this delegation of the takings power with respect to railroad companies sounds more 
in Congress’ power in the Constitution to regulate commerce between the states.  
Congress may also be explicitly recognizing the significant effect that these companies 
have on interstate commerce and the economic growth of the country.  In addition, both 
 
38 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. art. V.     
39 The current test for whether the exercise of eminent domain satisfies the “public use” portion of the Fifth 
Amendment is whether or not the exercise has a “public purpose.”  See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63; see also 
Fallbrook Irrigation Distr. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896).  The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a 
strict interpretation of “public use,” or a definition that comprehends the exercise of eminent domain only if the 
real property seized will be used by the public. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2633.    
40 See supra nn. 6, 25-32.    
41 Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2673 (U.S. 
2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of the three categories in which the government may 
transfer private property to private entities is in the case of common carriers, such as railroad companies 
and utility companies that will make the property available for public use.).  
42 See id. 
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railroad and public utilities, despite being owned by private parties, neatly satisfy the 
“public use” parameter of eminent domain, as they are used by the public.43 
Moreover, the private, for-profit corporation at issue in Luxton was a federal 
corporation, having been incorporated by Congressional act.  It was, therefore, arguably a 
corporation with an inherently public nature.44 In addition, some commentators have 
noted that, given the impact that railroad and public utilities have on the national 
economy, these private, for-profit companies should exercise eminent domain, as they 
save the government “time and money.”45 Furthermore, aggrieved landowners may seek 
just compensation through the judicial process.46 
More importantly, public utility companies, for example, are generally highly 
regulated, and they must serve any customer who qualifies for service in a non-
discriminatory manner, including being non-discriminatory in their rates.47 This 
requirement is in contrast to other private industry.48 In Texas, for instance, public 
utilities generally have the power of eminent domain, but regulation rules the roost- from 
the rates that are charged to customers to the requirement of acquiring licenses and 
franchises from state regulatory agencies and from cities, respectively, to the operation of 
facilities only after a state agency’s approval.49 Also, with respect to its use of eminent 
domain, Texas requires that a public utility may not run facilities on land acquired 
 
43 See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Power of Eminent 
Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (1996) (citing Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent 
Domain:  History and Policy, 11 ENVT. L. 1,28 (1980)). 
44 See Luxton, 153 U.S. at 529 (“The validity of the act of Congress incorporating the North River Bridge 
Company rests upon principles of constitutional law, now established beyond dispute.”). 
45 Lawrence supra note 5, at 657 (Similarly, allowing private enterprises such as railroads to directly 
exercise the power of eminent domain, saves the government time and money.”). 
46 See id. 
47 See Chris Reeder, Regulation by Contractors:  Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Entities in 
Texas, 5 TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 191, 229 (2004) (noting that public utilities, though private, for-
profit entities with eminent domain power have an “inherent public nature.”). 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
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through these coercive means unless a state agency has approved the operation.50 
Finally, the approval is based on a need for the utility.51 
In contrast, on balance, it may be argued that private, non-profit corporations have 
no such effect on interstate commerce.  What commercial interstate or intrastate effects 
that may arise, and the efficiency advantages that may be promoted by delegating the 
takings power to private, non-profit corporations without adequate safeguards, are 
outweighed significantly by procedural concerns under the Due Process Clause and 
notions of representative democracy. 
 Nevertheless, although it is certainly debatable whether or not a private, non-
profit actor’s exercise of eminent domain power pursuant to a delegation of the power 
satisfies federal or state constitutional “public use” requirements, the issue of whether or 
not the delegation of eminent domain itself to a private, non-profit actor accords with the 
accountability controls and due process underpinnings of PNDD is a separate question 
entirely from that of public use.52 Perhaps, as some commentators have noted, in 
previous generations, when public utilities and railroads were largely the sole private 
actors delegated the takings power, the idea of procedural due process controls that led to 
the disinterested exercise of the power was effectively moot, given that the public’s 
interest was impacted by the ability to move goods throughout the nation and access 
public utilities.53 However, in today’s era, when the Court most recently has expanded 
 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 493 (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that in response to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a delegation of legislative 
power to a private non-profit, deeming it unconstitutional pursuant to a eight-step inquiry, that the court 
failed to “consider the impact of its decision on the [Texas] Legislature’s common practice of delegating 
eminent domain powers to private entities.”); see also FM Properties, 22 S.W.2d at 899 (Abbott, J., 
dissenting) (making a similar case in answer to the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that the Texas 
legislature had unconstitutionally delegated power to private landowners to create water quality zones and 
questioning how the court could “reconcile” its holding with “existing legislative grants of eminent domain 
power to private entities.”).   
53 See Taylor, supra note 43, at 1083.   
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the “public use” requirement to include private economic development in Kelo, the time 
may be ripe for a separate examination of delegations to private actors that rests solely on 
PNDD grounds. 
 
III. Arguments Favoring and Disfavoring the Delegation of the Takings Power to Private, 
Non-Profit Corporations 
 
A.  Why Delegate Eminent Domain Power to Private, Non-Profit Corporations? 
 
As with the Public Non-Delegation Doctrine, there are a number of arguments in 
support of delegating the takings power to private, non-profit corporations.  An obvious 
argument is that delegating this power to private, non-profit corporations is more 
efficient.  Government, and therefore, taxpayers, are spared the time and expense of 
having to negotiate, seize, and purchase property under eminent domain, especially from 
recalcitrant landowners who may be opposed to the action.54 Instead, these costs are 
passed on to the private, non-profit corporation, and taxpayers, therefore, save money.   
For instance, in order to decrease the financial burden on taxpayers, a number of judges 
and courts use private arbitration mechanisms in lieu of appointing public judges to hear 
the same cases.55 
Moreover, government tends to be bureaucratic, and corporations more supple.56 
In the amount of time that it may take local government to seize property on behalf of a 
private, non-profit corporation, that same non-profit, by virtue of its non-bureaucratic 
nature, may have “moved on,” taking and investing with it much-needed dollars in 
another community.   
 
54 See id.  Indeed, some judges and courts have supported private delegation because it favors more 
“privatization” and less government “regulation” or interference.  See Texas Boll Weevil, 22 S.W.3d at 899 
(Abbott, J., dissenting). 
55 See id.  
56 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 655.   
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Furthermore, political efficiency may also warrant the delegation of eminent 
domain power to private, non-profit corporations.  When government decides to use its 
takings power, interest groups opposed to the action may utilize the political process to 
delay or to halt the taking.  The reaction by the several homeowners in Kelo who were 
opposed to the taking of their homes by the New London Development Corporation is a 
perfect example of this situation.  Not only did the economic development plan 
envisioned by the city of New London experience significant delay,57 but also the 
homeowners’ actions sparked a nationwide outcry against the use of the takings power 
for economic development.58 Similarly, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
 
57 William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 2005, 
at A1.  In June 2006, however, New London voted, in opposition to the stance taken by Connecticut’s  governor 
to evict the remaining hold-outs in Fort Trumbull. See Avi Salzman, Connecticut City Takes First Step to Evict 
Eminent Domain Case, NEW YORK TIMES, June 6, 2006, at B2.  Furthermore, in July 2006, the city’s Planning 
and Zoning Commission granted building permits for the economic development project to begin.  See Elaine 
Stoll, Commission Approves Hotel Suite Plan For Fort Trumbull, THE DAY, July 22, 2006, at 2B. 
58 See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2; see 
also Timothy Egan, Rulings Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at 
A12.  Furthermore, at last count, approximately 41 states had introduced legislation to limit the use of eminent 
domain for private economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to 
Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.  For instance, in California alone, five constitutional 
amendments and eight proposed pieces of legislation have been put before the California Legislature to counter 
the Court’s decision in Kelo. In Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of eminent domain on 
behalf of a private party, except for certain uses.  Among these exceptions is the taking of land for a new stadium 
for the Dallas Cowboys football team. In addition, in Ohio, the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all 
takings soon after the Kelo ruling. See id.; see also Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at 1A (noting the one-year moratorium in Ohio); see generally Terry Pristin, Developers 
Can't Imagine a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (discussing different 
measures that states have taken in response to Kelo and noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from 
developers, some lawmakers, and the real estate community).  With respect to action taken on the federal level, 
as of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President that makes 
appropriations for certain government agencies and provides that no funds shall be used for federal, state, or local 
projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain for economic development that would primarily benefit 
private parties. See Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 
2494-2495 (2005).  Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 4128, a bill that 
proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving federal economic development funds 
for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules that eminent domain has been used for economic 
development. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).  The same 
legislation also allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to enforce any provision of the 
proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney’s fees should a plaintiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c).  It also 
prevents the federal government from using eminent domain for economic development. Id. § 3.  The proposed 
law broadly defines economic development as, “taking private property, without the consent of the owner, and 
conveying or leasing such property from one private person or entity to another private person or entity for 
commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general 
economic health . . . .” Id. § 8(1).  As of the writing of this Article, however, the U.S. Senate has not acted on this 
measure.  In general, however, although new legislation to protect private property owners from economic 
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Detroit,59 the residents of the Poletown neighborhood made national headlines by using 
the political process to protest General Motors (GM) and the city of Detroit for seizing 
their land for the construction of a Cadillac manufacturing plant.  The residents achieved 
a temporary victory in delaying the “quick-take” project, but they were ultimately 
powerless to stop the takings.60 
Therefore, much as members of Congress may relish delegating power to federal 
agencies because the agencies “take the heat” for unpopular decisions with the electorate 
and these representatives may “look good” before their constituents when opposing those 
decisions,61 state legislators may often welcome the delegation of the takings power to 
non-profits.  Legislators are ultimately removed from political and electoral 
accountability, yet, by virtue of the delegation, may simultaneously and indirectly bestow 
benefits onto powerful non-profit corporations in exchange for financial support that 
keeps them in office.     
Yet another powerful reason that legislatures may delegate the power of eminent 
domain is that, as with all delegations, there is nothing in the Constitution and in many 
state constitutions that expressly forbids delegation of legislative power to other entities, 
private or public, or to other branches of government.62 In effect, there is no Private or 
Public Non-Delegation Doctrine written into the Constitution or in many state 
 
development takings is still being introduced the legislative momentum spurred by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Kelo seems to have slowed tremendously almost a year after the decision.   
59 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take 
land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto 
plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were substantial). 
60 The residents opposed to the project in the Poletown neighborhood formed the Poletown Neighborhood 
Council. See Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground:  Using Eminent Domain for Economic 
Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1868 (2005).  For an excellent history of the Poletown case, see 
generally BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND  (1986).
61 See THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE U.S. 92-3, 298-99 (1969) 
(“As Kenneth Davis puts it, Congress in effect says, ‘Here is the problem:  deal with it.”) and (“A 
delegation of power to the president or to agencies is in reality a delegation of personal responsibility [by 
Congress] . . .  . ”). 
62 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 322. 
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constitutions.63 Indeed, Professor Sunstein notes that, with respect to the Public Non-
Delegation Doctrine, the Founders did not find troublesome the delegation of power from 
Congress to the President for the distribution of military pensions and the granting of 
licenses that permitted trade with Native American groups.64 Consequently, a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution and the countless state constitutions modeled after it, 
along with constitutional and legislative history, would suggest that the delegation of the 
takings power to private, non-profit corporations is constitutional. 
A final reason to support the notion that the private delegation of power to non-
profits is not problematic is that legislatures in delegating this power should be given 
deference in the decisions they make.  Most notably, in Berman v. Parker,65 a case in 
which the Court upheld the delegation of eminent domain power to the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency for economic development of a slum-ridden 
District neighborhood, the Court stated that “ . . . when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases, the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served.”66 
The Court went on to note that once the “public purpose had been established,” “the 
means of executing the project are for Congress and for Congress alone to determine,” 
and the private enterprise could serve the ends of Congress as well as government.67 
Not only was the legislative deference espoused in Berman recently reaffirmed by 
the Court in Kelo, 68 but also the Kelo Court underscored the “great respect” that it held 
 
63 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 331 (expressing the belief that the Constitution includes a Non-Delegation 
Doctrine, but that there is no “express nondelegation doctrine in the text.”) (emphasis added). 
64 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at  322-23 & 331-32. 
65 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
66 Id. at 32. 
67 Id. at 33-34.   
68 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664-65. 
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for state legislatures’ assessments and determinations of “local needs.”69 With respect 
specifically to the delegation of public power to private entities, some commentators have 
noted that such a choice can be “reasonable and therefore deserves the judicial respect 
given any reasonable legislative policy choice.”70 Finally, in at least one federal circuit, 
the Fourth Circuit has indicated that legislative deference in a case involving the use of 
eminent domain by the federal government to build a dam should only be disrupted if 
there is a case of “arbitrary, capricious, or corrupt conduct.”71 
B.  Arguments In Support of Restricting Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to 
Private, Non-Profit Corporations 
 
The right to seize property is a traditional government power that, like most 
similar government powers such as the power to arrest someone, to tax, and to license, is 
coercive in nature.72 The sovereign may force an individual to do or not to do something 
against his or her will.73 When this coercive power of seizure of property is delegated to 
private, non-profits, indeed to any private party, there is undoubtedly created an 
opportunity for these parties to seize property for themselves at the expense of the public.  
They may also act in their own interests instead of in the public’s interest and to the 
general detriment of the public or to an individual.74 This opportunity for “self-
interested”75 action is a result of a classic conflict-of-interest scenario.   
 
69 Id. at 2664.  In addition, at the state level, some courts have noted that the legislative branch has the sole 
power to “invest” certain entities at its choosing, public or private, with eminent domain power.  See, e.g,. 
Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 647 (Mo. 1965). 
70 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 651.   
71 U.S. v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, 334 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1964). 
72 See supra nn. 6, 25-29. 
73 See id. 
74 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 659 (noting that “[t]he concern is that governmental power—power 
coercive in nature—will be used to further the private interests of the private actor, as opposed to some 
different public interest.”); see also Froomkin, supra note 15, at 153-54 (discussing that “. . . the Carter 
Coal doctrine forbidding delegation of public power to private groups, in in fact, rooted in a prohibition 
against self-interested regulation . . . .”). 
75 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 660. 
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The delegation of public power, such as eminent domain, to private parties may 
be contrasted with similar delegations to government agencies.  However, unlike private 
parties, agencies are often headed by appointees of the head of the executive branch and 
confirmed by the legislature, or are directly elected in some states.76 In addition, officers 
must generally take an oath of office promising that they will uphold the laws of the land, 
not their self-interest.77 Furthermore, there is often the weight of the public purse and the 
prospect of a cut in funding to a particular agency by the legislature that keeps an agency 
accountable, should the agency be mismanaged and act in ways that benefit certain 
parties and not the public.78 In contrast, delegating the power to seize property to private 
actors chips away at the United States’ democratic form of government by giving an 
extraordinary power to private, non-profit corporations that are unaccountable to the 
electorate.79 
In essence, there is an expectation that a government official with coercive 
governmental powers in hand will act in a “disinterested” way and not allow self-interest 
to guide his or her decision-making.80 When this expectation is not satisfied in the 
public’s opinion, then the electorate “may vote the [public] rascals out.” 81 The public is, 
therefore, utilizing the ultimate mechanism of democracy, the voting booth, to rule on the 
government’s substantive choices and the way that it chooses to exercise its power.   
With private exercise of public power, however, such as the disagreeable exercise 
of the takings power delegated to a private, non-profit, no similar mechanism exists to 
 
76 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 218, 226 (discussing the accountability measures on public agencies in 
Texas). 
77 See id. at 218. 
78 See id. 
79 See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 159.  However, Lawrence notes that the challenge with basing a judicial 
decision that involves the delegation of public power to private actors on notions of representative 
democracy is that these notions are “supraconstitutional,” and are not found in the specific text of the 
Constitution or in state constitutions.  They may, therefore, reflect and impose a judge’s value system, as 
opposed to the rule of law, on unsuspecting litigants.  Lawrence, supra note 5, at 671.     
80 Id. 
81 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 660. 
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deal with these “private rascals.”82 In addition, a similar lack of accountability exists 
when this power is delegated with little or no checks on its exercise, such as ultimately 
holding an elected official accountable through elections.83 This source of accountability 
would likely publicly present another point of view and possibly force a change or the 
halt of a private, non-profit’s use of the power.  In the eminent domain arena, it is this 
lack of accountability that may fuel opportunities for private, non-profits to self-
aggrandize.     
 This reasoning led the U.S. Supreme Court in Carter Coal in 1936 to decry the 
private delegation of public power as “most obnoxious.”84 Similarly, it was this same 
argument that motivated a concurring opinion by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Boll 
Weevil almost 60 years later,85 in examining whether or not the delegation of the power to 
assess fees to the Boll Weevil Foundation was congruent with the Texas Constitution, to 
describe it as “[l]ittle more than a posse: volunteers and private entities neither elected 
nor appointed, privately organized and supported by the majority of some small group, 
backed by law but without guidelines or supervision, wielding great power over people’s 
lives and property but answering virtually to no one.”86 
Therefore, although the delegation of eminent domain power to private, non-profit 
entities with little or no accountability controls may be more time and cost-efficient, as 
well as more politically efficient and expedient, more important values, such as 
procedural due process,87 are being sacrificed.  Equally troublesome is the belief that 
concern for deference to the legislature and the lack of explicit language in the 
Constitution or in many state constitutions forbidding private delegation of public power 
 
82 Id. 
83 See e.g. infra Parts V.C.1.a. & b and VI.A. 
84 See Part II.B., supra nn. 22-23. 
85 See supra note 20. 
86 Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 479 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
87 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 682-83; see also infra Parts IV. A. & B. 
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should trump more fundamental concerns related to the prospect of the takings power’s 
being exercised by private, non-profit corporations.  These non-profits have everything to 
gain in their self-interest, but nothing by which to hold them accountable.  In addition, 
legislators, by virtue of the democratic process in the United States, are not impervious to 
the influence of particularly powerful private, non-profit corporations, that like their for-
profit cousins, are politically organized and provide electoral and financial support to 
legislators who may vote to delegate highly coercive power to them.88 
Moreover, the mere threat of a private, non-profit corporation’s having eminent 
domain power, regardless of whether or not it actually uses it to seize private property, is 
reason enough to argue for restrictions or controls on its use.  It is likely that this mere 
threat is intimidating, especially to unsophisticated homeowners and small business 
owners who are unfamiliar with eminent domain and who may be scared into selling their 
real property at below-market prices at the first mention of “eminent domain” by a 
powerful private institution.   
In addition, even should a private landowner be given a right to a judicial hearing 
and/or trial upon a private, non-profit corporation’s assertion of eminent domain power 
under an enabling statute, the hiring of attorneys, court costs, and expert witnesses 
required for such a process may be entirely too expensive and cumbersome for the 
average homeowner and small business owner threatened with eminent domain.  
Consequently, any procedural due process rights that may be conferred to a landowner 
are effectively foreclosed by the sheer expense of asserting them.  Furthermore, even 
when the enabling legislation allows for this type of judicial process, often the process 
 
88 See RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE, 354 (1990). (Posner emphasizes that financial 
backing is the most necessary tool in winning a campaign), and Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:  
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1005, 1016 (2004). (stating that “[l]ittle prevents municipalities and private interests from abusing the 
system.  Both corporate interests and political leaders dependent on their support have tremendous 
incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of projects furthered by condemnation.”). 
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simply involves determining the actual value of the real property seized and addressing 
the issue of whether or not the compensation paid by the private, non-profit corporation is 
just.89 Therefore, the question of whether or not the delegation of the takings power to a 
private, non-profit corporation is even valid or constitutional under Due Process or any 
other doctrine is similarly and effectively foreclosed in the courts for many landowners 
who lack the resources to undertake a full constitutional determination of the issue.90 
Finally, one of the strongest arguments in support of statutory controls on the 
delegation of the takings power to private, non-profit corporations is that when 
government or a quasi-governmental organization chooses to exercise this power, it is 
often, at the very least, after intense public discussion and public hearings that provide for 
a significant amount of public input.  The effect of these public conversations is often to 
compel government to consider alternative points of view that may conceivably force a 
re-thinking or the abandonment of its use.91 Should these public discussions not result in 
outcomes favorable to the public, then the electorate has the opportunity to hold 
government accountable for its decision at election time by choosing to allow officials to 
stay in office.92 Consequently, when government and even public agencies are expected 
(1) to hold public hearings, (2) are subject to being voted out of office, and (3) are 
expected to abide by the minimum federal constitutional requirements of “just 
 
89 See, e.g., infra nn. 224-225, Part V.B.3. 
90 See id. 
91 See, e.g., Rad Sallee, Metro Schedules Three Public Hearings on New Rail Line, HOUS. CHRON., July 14, 
2006, at B7 (reporting that Houston, Texas’, public transport authority, or METRO, that has eminent 
domain power, has scheduled a series of public hearings regarding its proposed expansion of commuter rail 
in neighborhoods and that contemplates the use of eminent domain). 
92 See e.g., Wendy Hudley, Allison Says Voters Wanted Change He Credits Opposition to Underpass as 
Key to Council Victory, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 16, 2005, at 1S (discussing the ousting of an 
incumbent from the Richardson, Texas, City Council, the first in 16 years, who had supported the use of 
eminent domain); Clay Barbour, Eminent Domain's Electoral Fallout, Elected Officials Face Widespread 
Opposition and Voter Wrath, ST. LOUIS POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1; Sofia Kosmetatos, Highland Park 
Incumbents Prevail, and Point to Plan for Downtown, June 8, 2005, at 27; Lisa Smith, St. Charles Voters 
Hand Mayor's Job to De Witte, Klinkhamer's Eight-year Tenure Ends Following Bitter Campaign, DAILY 
HERALD, Apr. 6,  2005, at 1 (noting that now ex-mayor Klinkhamer had approved condemnation of 
property for a redevelopment project the year before, without involving the public). 
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compensation” and “public use”, and any additional state requirements, it is no more than 
logical that private entities empowered with government-like powers to coerce the 
seizure of private property should be subject to even more stringent requirements. 
 
C. A Per Se Rule Against the Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to Private, Non-
Profit and Charitable Corporations? 
 
Given the reasons outlined in Part III.B. of this Article in support of restrictions 
on private actor delegates in the takings context, the question arises as to whether or not 
there should be a per se rule prohibiting delegations of the takings power to private, non-
profit and charitable corporations.  Indeed, this line of reasoning is strengthened, as these 
private actors may have significant political and economic power that may bind them 
inextricably to elected officials and allow them to influence officials to a large degree.  
Despite the persuasive arguments in favor of a per se abolishment of private 
delegations of the takings power, this Article takes a more pragmatic approach to them.  
As noted in Part V.B. of this Article with respect to the Texas Medical Center case study, 
the economic impact of some private, non-profit corporations delegated the takings 
power on local communities is immense.  This economic impact, whether on an entire 
city, as in the Texas Medical Center case study in Houston, or on an entire neighborhood, 
as in the Dudley Neighbors, Inc. case study in Boston, is a double-edged sword to local 
communities.93 Essentially, in exchange for this economic impact and the significant 
“run-off” effects onto the local community, there is an argument that it may be 
reasonable to afford these entities the takings power, albeit not without limits, safeguards, 
or controls.  In addition, there is the further argument that, to a certain extent, local 
communities should be able to decide how much of the takings power and by what 
strictures they are willing to delegate to a private non-profit.  
 
93 See infra Parts V.A. & B.    
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Allowing room for the delegation of the takings power to these private actors, 
however, does not otherwise diminish the argument that there need be suitable statutory 
safeguards, controls, or as Professor Froomkin terms it, “accountability mechanisms” 94 
that preserve procedural due process.  Just as there should be no absolutes with respect to 
the prohibition of these delegations, private actors delegated the takings power should not 
be absolutely free to seize another individual’s land, unfettered by appropriate and 
reasonable statutory safeguards that ensure that the rights of all affected individuals are 
respected.95 
IV.  A Procedural Due Process Approach to the Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to 
Private, Non-Profit Corporations 
 
A.  Procedural Due Process Generally 
 
The delegation of any public power to private parties, including the delegation of 
eminent domain power to private, non-profit corporations almost automatically invokes 
procedural due process concerns.  First, as a starting point, due process is invoked when 
the government, or in the case studies examined in this Article, a private actor, uses its 
delegated coercive power to impinge upon an individual’s life, liberty, or property.96 
Second, one of the fundamental notions attached to procedural due process is ensuring 
that the decision-maker acts in the interest of the public, as opposed to his or her personal 
interest or bias, by compelling decisions that are subject to controls and safeguards.97 
Indeed, procedural due process has been invoked to prevent “arbitrary decision-
making” by those with public power, or decision-making that is affected or influenced by 
 
94 See supra note 21. 
95 See infra Part VI. regarding recommendations for statutory safeguards. 
96 See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (stating that “[t]he point is 
straightforward:  the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property 
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”).   
97 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 661. 
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personal interests rather than what is best for the public.98 Conversely, if, by virtue of a 
private delegation of public power, a decision-maker exercises this power against an 
individual and is unbound by procedural due process safeguards against arbitrary or self-
interested use of this power, then it may be argued that an individual may have suffered a 
deprivation of procedural due process.99 Basic tenets of procedural due process, 
therefore, require that decision-making be disinterested.  This disinterestedness, in the 
eminent domain context, may be ensured by the use of certain procedures, such as 
holding elected officials accountable for the takings decisions of private, non-profits.100 
B.  Justification for the Use of Procedural Due Process Principles in Private Delegations 
of the Takings Power 
 
The theory of using due process concepts to assess the private delegation of 
public power is not inconceivable or extraordinary.  Indeed, one scholar has noted that 
state courts that have struck down private delegations, in keeping with Carter Coal, have 
honed in on the self-interested nature of such delegations.101 Furthermore, case law 
demonstrates that the use of public power to make self-interested decisions on behalf of a 
private party is violative of due process.102 In addition, while there is an argument that 
 
98 See Note, supra note 30, at 1408 (stating that “T[p]ublic’ powers may mean powers which the legislature 
intended to be exercised for the public welfare, not the delegate’s; there the effect of the rule [against 
private delegations of public power] is to require procedures ensuring responsible and impartial decisions.  
More often, the rule operates as a limitation on the creation of private powers to be exercised for the 
protection of some interest of the delegate.”). 
99 See id at 1399 (commenting that “[b]ut whether or not law-making power is deemed delegated, the 
legislature’s supreme power remains intact. The significant question therefore is one of due process:  
whether legislation which commits these substantial powers to private hands is reasonable.”), and 1408 
(noting that “a private group ought not to be given a power to restrict the activities either of its members or 
of outsiders where that power may be exercised arbitrarily and without adequate procedural safeguards.  
Thus, the rule against delegation may be regarded primarily as an extension of the constitutional principle 
of due process.”).  The nature of due process suggests that there must be action against “identifiable 
individuals.”  Lawrence, supra note 5, at 682.   The case studies examined in this Article presume that 
particularized individuals are affected by takings actions by private, non-profit and charitable corporations.  
See infra Parts V.A. and B.  
100 See infra Part VI. for other suggested procedures or accountability mechanisms. 
101 See Freeman, supra note 3, at 585-86. 
102 See Suss, 823 F.Supp. at 188 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), Commonwealth Coatings 
v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 
(1944), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).   
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due process principles are simply inapposite to private delegations on the federal level, 
given the federal courts’ long-time reluctance to strike down a private delegation as 
unconstitutional, the fact remains that a due process inquiry into private delegations has 
not been explicitly foreclosed by the federal courts. 103 The due process inquiry also  
remains popular in the state courts.104 
In the eminent domain arena, courts have gone so far to state that due process is 
even invoked when attempts are made to correct partial and biased uses of governmental 
power, such as in the form of paying landowners for compensation for the taking of their 
land.105 Furthermore, the notion of placing accountability controls and safeguards on the 
private delegation of the takings power is similarly not unheard of.  In addition to the 
common requirement that a taking be used for a public use or for a public purpose, some 
states have taken several steps to mitigate the self-interested use of eminent domain 
power by requiring the approval of a state agency for a particular seizure. 106 States 
further require an agency to investigate the purpose for which land is seized.107 In 
addition, several state courts view private use of the takings power more circumspectly 
than public use.108 
C. Two Judicial Tests that Assess the Constitutionality of the Private Delegation of 
Public Power 
 
1.  The Texas Boll Weevil Test 
 
a.  Description  
 
103 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 672-73. 
104 See id. 
105 See Suss., 823 F.Supp. at 189. 
106 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 686. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
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In its 1997 Texas Boll Weevil decision, the Texas Supreme Court struck down the 
creation and delegation of power to the private, non-profit Texas Boll Weevil Eradication 
Foundation by the Texas legislature as unconstitutional under the Private Non-Delegation 
Doctrine.109 The legislature had created the Foundation in order to eradicate the boll 
weevil insect, a pest that attacks cotton crops and results in significant economic damage 
to cotton producers.110 In the decision, the court outlined a preliminary three-part inquiry 
to use in determining the constitutionality of a private delegation.111 This initial three-
part test involves:  (1)  determining whether or not the powers delegated to an entity are 
legislative or law-making112 pursuant to separation of powers analysis,113 that dictates 
that any power deemed legislative must stay in the legislative branch;  (2)  assessing 
whether or not the delegate is private or public;114 and (3)  if the delegation inquiry 
survives the previous two parts, analyzing the constitutionality of a delegation under an 
additional eight-part test.  This eight-part test has been distilled from the scholarly work 
of several well-known academics in the non-delegation field, such as Professors Jaffe, 
Liebmann, Davis, and Lawrence.115 The Texas Boll Weevil court, however, made it clear 
that the eight-part test was strictly for private delegations, 116 noting that it was required 
to give “more searching scrutiny” to these delegations.117 
109 See supra note 20. 
110 See id. 
111 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 213 (describing the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil test). 
112 Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465. 
113 Id.
114 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 213; see also Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470 (“We first address 
whether the Foundation is a public or private entity for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine.”). 
115 Professor Jaffe is the author of the seminal law review article, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 
HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); see also Jaffe, supra note 6.  Professor Liebmann wrote Delegation to Private 
Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND.L.J. 650 (1975), see supra note 17, and Professor Davis 
authored the first edition and a 1970 Supplement to an administrative law treatise that has been heavily 
referred to in delegation circles entitled, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978).  
Professor Lawrence’s work is cited throughout this Article. See Lawrence, supra note 5.   
116 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. 
117 Id. at 469; see also supra nn. 21-25, 85-86.  
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Hence, the constitutional analysis in Texas Boll Weevil centers on whether or not 
there has been an impermissible delegation of legislative power, power that is supposed 
to lie in the legislative branch under both the United States and the Texas 
Constitutions.118 Despite the initial three-part inquiry, the heart of the Texas Boll Weevil 
analysis is the following eight-part test:   
 
(1)   Are the private delegate’s actions subject to meaningful review by a 
 state agency or other branch of state government?; 
 
(2)   Are the persons affected by the private delegate’s actions adequately 
 represented in the decision making process?; 
 
(3)   Is the private delegate’s power limited to making rules, or does the 
 delegate also apply the law to particular individuals?; 
 
(4)   Does the private delegate have a pecuniary or other personal interest 
 that may conflict with his or her public function?; 
 
(5)   Is the private delegate empowered to define criminal acts or impose 
 criminal sanctions?; 
 
(6)   Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent, and subject matter?; 
 
(7)   Does the private delegate possess special qualifications or training 
 for the task delegated to it?; and 
 
118 Article 1, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution notes that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art 1, § 1.  Similarly, Article II, § 1 of the Texas 
Constitution states that “[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which 
are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and 
no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly 
attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.”  TEX. CONST. art II, § 
1.  In addition, Article III, § 1 of the Texas Constitution mirrors the legislative vesting language of Article 
I, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution by affirming that “[t]he Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a 
Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled ‘The Legislature of the State of 
Texas.’”  TEX. CONST. art III, § 1. For additional explanation of the constitutional foundations of private 
and public delegations of power in Texas, see infra note 183.     
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(8)   Has the Legislature provided sufficient standards to guide the private 
 delegate in its work?119 
In elucidating this eight-part test, the Texas court further provided several 
indications as to how the eight factors should be weighed.  For instance, the Texas Boll 
Weevil court noted that, in order for a private delegation to be an overly broad delegation 
of legislative power under the provision of the Texas constitution that vests lawmaking 
power solely in the legislature, a “majority of the factors” must be violated.120 In 
addition, the court noted that the legislation at issue, the Texas Boll Weevil Act, was to 
be constitutionally reviewed “as a whole.”121 Nonetheless, the court signaled a 
cautionary note in its application of the Texas Boll Weevil test, stating that it was to be 
applied “sparingly”122 when private delegation was “’running riot.’”123 Moreover, the 
court definitively stated that a private delegation did not have to comply with all eight 
factors in order to pass constitutional muster under the Texas constitution- it just needed 
to satisfy a majority of them.124 
b.  Subsequent Glosses on the Texas Boll Weevil Test 
 
i.  Proctor v. Andrews125 
In 1998, one year after the Texas Supreme Court identified the eight-part Texas 
Boll Weevil test, the court further clarified it in Proctor v. Andrews. Proctor called into 
question the constitutionality of Texas’ Civil Service Act,126 that provided firefighters 
and police officers means to appeal decisions made by their superiors in which they were 
 
119 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. 
120 Id. at 475.   
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  (citing Justice Cardozo in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 at 553).   
124 See id. 
125 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998). 
126 Tex. Local Gov't Code § 143.001. 
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suspended, passed over for promotion, or demoted.  The officer or firefighter could 
appeal either to the local civil service commission or to an independent third party.127 If 
the officer were to choose the latter route, the city was required to request seven qualified 
neutral arbitrators from either the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).128 Under the statute, a municipality 
was required to strike the names of those arbitrators that it would not choose to conduct 
the hearings.129 Unless the decision of this arbitrator was unlawful, the decisions were 
final, and the officer or firefighter effectively waived his right to appeal the decision to 
the district court.130 In Proctor, three cases were consolidated in which the city of 
Lubbock had failed to request seven arbitrators or to strike arbitrators pursuant to the 
statute.131 Proctor filed suit seeking a declaratory injunction compelling Lubbock’s 
compliance, and the city counter-sued contending that the Civil Service Act was 
unconstitutional.132 
The Proctor court held that the Texas legislature had not acted unconstitutionally 
in delegating lawmaking authority to private parties that were private arbitration services 
under Texas’s Civil Service Act.133 The court first stated that the case involved a 
delegation of power to a private actor,134 and it essentially declined to conduct the private 
versus public actor analysis in the second part of the initial three-part inquiry that it 
embraced in Texas Boll Weevil.135 
127 See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 732. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998).  
134 See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 733 (“Because the delegates in the instant case are not affiliated with any 
department of the state government . . . .”). 
135 See supra note 114. 
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Secondly, the court explained that when a private actor is the recipient of a 
delegation, then the constitutional underpinnings of the Texas Boll Weevil test stem from 
Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution that vests legislative power in the 
legislative branch.136 In contrast, the Texas Boll Weevil court held that the test sounded 
in the separation of powers provisions found in Art. II, Section 1 of the Texas 
Constitution.137 Another gloss on the Texas Boll Weevil test that the Proctor court 
provided was to state that, even with the eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, it would 
interpret delegations in the most constitutional light possible.138 
ii.  FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin139 
Subsequently, in 2000, the Texas Supreme Court decided FM Properties, a case 
in which the city of Austin sought a declaratory injunction against private land owners 
who owned more than 500 acres of land, from designating "water quality and protection 
zones" within Austin’s extraterritorial jurisdictions.140 The city contended that section 
26.179 of the Texas Water Code,141 that allowed landowners to designate certain water 
zones as “protected,” was an unconstitutional delegation of power.  It also provided the 
following five reasons to support its arguments that the pertinent section of the Water 
Code was unconstitutional:  1) the provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative 
powers to private landowners; 2) it targeted the city of Austin; 3) the statute infringed on 
the city's home rule powers conferred by the Texas Constitution; 4) it violated the city's 
 
136 Nonetheless, the court also stated that the Texas Boll Weevil test could be applied to delegations of 
legislative authority derived from the separations of powers language in Article III, Section 1 of the Texas 
constitution.  See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735.   
137 See supra note 113. 
138 See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735 (“Thus, we consider all eight factors, keeping in mind that if it is 
possible to interpret the language of the statute in a manner that renders it constitutional, we must do so.”) 
(citing Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Co. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662) (Tex. 1996)). 
139 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000); see also supra note 20.   
140 See Proctor, 22 S.W.3d at 872. 
141 Tex. Water Code § 26.179. 
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property rights; and 5) the statute allowed private property owners to suspend the laws.142 
The court struck down the delegation of power to private landowners to create water 
quality zones as unconstitutional.143 
In addition, the court in FM Properties provided further clarification on the 
weight of each the eight factors in the Texas Boll Weevil test.  For instance, the court 
stated that the weight of the factors was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
according to each individual set of facts.144 Still, it generally noted that when it came to 
private delegations of legislative power, two factors in the Texas Boll Weevil test would 
be most “heavily” weighted because they address the “central concerns” behind the 
delegation of power to private parties: (1)  whether or not “the private delegate’s actions 
are subject to meaningful review by a state agency or other branch of state government;” 
and (2)  whether or not the “private actor has a pecuniary or other personal interest that 
may conflict with his or her public function.”145 
The central concerns referenced by the Texas Supreme Court in FM Properties 
are ones that necessarily invoke the procedural due process underpinnings of the PNDD  
advocated in this Article.  These concerns are the obvious opportunities for self-interested 
actions or choices that may guide a private actor that has been delegated public power 
and whether or not there are any accompanying accountability mechanisms in the 
enabling legislation to make these choices as disinterested as possible. 
 For instance, one of the “heavily” weighted factors identified by the court in FM 
Properties focused on whether or not there is “meaningful government review,” either by 
 
142 See FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 868, 872. 
143 See FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 868. 
144 See FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 875 (“Boll Weevil does not specify if any factors weigh more heavily 
than others, but the importance of each factor will necessarily differ in each case,” and noting that the 
inquiry in Texas Boll Weevil places heavy emphasis on the first factor of the eight-part inquiry, or whether 
there is meaningful government review of a private delegate’s action).     
145 Id. at 875. 
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a state agency or other part of government, of a private delegate’s actions.146 The 
requirement of “meaningful government review” goes to one of the most potent and 
central ways in a democracy in which private delegates of power may be held 
accountable for ostensibly “public” actions - directly or indirectly holding elected 
officials responsible for choices made by private delegates.   
In addition, the other “heavily” weighted factor in the Texas Boll Weevil test 
subsequently emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court in FM Properties assessed the 
financial or personal interest that a private actor might have in exercising delegated 
authority to it.  This factor, therefore, allowed the court to concentrate on the inherently 
self-interested opportunities that arise for private delegates of public power.  
 Finally, in FM Properties, the Texas court further refined the definition of 
legislative power, at issue in the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil inquiry.147 The court 
stated in FM Properties that legislative power is generally the power “to make rules and 
determine public policy,” while including “many administrative aspects, including the 
power to provide the details of the law, to promulgate rules and regulations to apply the 
law, and to ascertain conditions upon which existing laws may operate.”148 
c.  The Texas Boll Weevil Test Under Scrutiny 
 
The eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test has been criticized by some commentators 
as too vague and subjective.149 Indeed, although the Texas Supreme Court stated that a 
private delegation must pass muster under a majority of the eight factors to be 
 
146 See supra Part IV.D.1.a. note 119.   
147 See supra note 112. 
148 FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 873. 
149 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 222-23 (asserting that the test gives little “guidance” to lower courts, 
legislators, and private parties because of its “vagueness” and that it “simply describes a subjective 
analysis.”). 
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nonviolative of the state constitution, it is unclear exactly how many factors constitute a 
majority.  It is also unclear how much each factor should be weighted.  For example, the 
delegation analysis by the court in Texas Boll Weevil resulted in the delegation’s “failing” 
five of the factors, “passing” one factor, and being “inconclusive” or neutral in two 
others.150 In contrast, in Proctor, the delegation “passed” all factors, except for one.151 
Highlighting the subjective nature of the eight-part case-by-case inquiry, the Texas 
Supreme Court in Proctor disagreed with the state court of appeals’ weighing of,  
whether or not “the Legislature had provided sufficient standards to guide the private 
delegate in its work, as against the delegation.”152 
Similarly, in FM Properties, in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that it 
would weigh whether or not there was “meaningful government review” and the private 
delegate’s interests more “heavily” than other factors, the court in a numerical breakdown 
determined that four factors of the eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test weighed against the 
delegation.153 Two of these factors weighed “heavily” against the constitutionality of the 
delegation.154 On the other hand, the court noted that the delegation passed muster under 
two of the factors and was neutral with respect to others.  Thus, the numerical breakdown 
that permitted the court to strike down the private delegation in FM Properties, was four 
against (two heavily), two in favor, and two neutral.155 
150 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 473-75 (explaining and providing analysis that the first, third, 
fourth, seventh, and eighth factors “weighed against” the delegation, the second factor weighed in favor of 
it, and the fifth and sixth factors were neutral). 
151 See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735-38 (providing a numerical tally of the analysis of the factors, in which 
the delegation passed all factors except for the first factor in the Texas Boll Weevil inquiry, and providing 
reasons for the analytical result). 
152Id. at 737-38 (highlighting the eighth factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test). 
153 FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 880-88 (providing an analysis of the factors and determining that the first, 
second, fourth, and sixth factors of the Texas Boll Weevil inquiry weighed against the delegation, of which 
the first and fourth weighed “heavily” against it, but noting that the delegation passed muster under the 
third and fifth factors of the inquiry, whereas there was a neutral outcome for the seventh and eighth 
factors); see also supra note 119. 
154 See id. 
155 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 213. 
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Indeed, with the wide mix of numerical scenarios that has resulted in the 
application of the Texas Boll Weevil test in only three cases involving private delegation 
of power, there are conceivably a limitless number of numerical possibilities and 
weighted outcomes, yielding a wide band of subjectivity and making the test “susceptible 
to nuance.”156 Questions, therefore, abound.  As one commentator has noted:  
 
What would be the “right” mix of factors and heavily weighted factors 
that would warrant upholding a private delegation?  What if the enactment 
narrowly fails five factors, but passes the other three by a wide margin?  
Could a particular act fail a particular factor in such an appalling and 
offensive way that it requires invalidating the delegation, even if it passes 
all other factors?  Should the courts simply count all factors as equal, or 
perform a weighted average balancing test?  How should courts account 
for neutral factors?157 
Nonetheless, while it is true that it the application of the Texas Boll Weevil test has not 
yet resulted in clear numerical formulas and weights for each of the eight factors, the 
Texas Supreme Court has, at each application of the test, increasingly approached this 
point.  
 For example, after applying the test only three times, the court surmised in FM 
Properties that of all eight factors, those touching upon meaningful government review 
and the financial or personal interest of the private delegate are most important.  
Furthermore, the same questions raised with respect to the lack of a clear mathematical 
formula for determining whether a private delegation is unconstitutional, from a federal 
or state perspective, are common to many case-by-case, multi-step judicial tests.  The 
nature of the law is such that it is difficult to provide precise mathematical formulas, 
given the fungible nature of facts and the myriad ways in which enabling statutes 
authorizing private delegations may be made.  
 
156Id. at 223. 
157 Id. 
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Moreover, the Texas Boll Weevil test, while not perfect, is one of the few 
comprehensive tests that examine the constitutionality of the private delegations of public 
power.  The test is, therefore, a good starting point by which to analyze this issue, given 
that it addresses, from a procedural due process perspective, the core concern of 
procedural due process, to balance and to check the self-interested use of coercive power 
by verifiable and appropriate accountability mechanisms.  
 
d. Proposed Modifications of the Texas Boll Weevil Test that Address Procedural 
Due Process Concerns of Private Delegations in the Eminent Domain Context  
 
i.  The Eight-Part Core Test 
The Texas Boll Weevil test is a good analytical starting point because it is one of 
the few comprehensive tests to examine the constitutionality of private delegations, and it 
addresses and distills many of the long-time concerns with these delegations that have 
been discussed by commentators.  There is, nonetheless, room for improvement of the 
test in the eminent domain context.  
 For example, at least with regard to the procedural due process concerns 
expressed in this Article, such as the importance of ensuring disinterested application of a 
private delegation of public power through appropriate accountability controls, it appears 
that the factors embodying (1) meaningful government oversight of the delegation, (2) 
whether or not individuals affected by a private delegate’s action have an opportunity to 
be heard, (3) the self-interest of the exercised action by the private delegate and how this 
interest affects the delegate’s public function, and (4) whether or not there are any 
existing limitations on the private delegate’s power, squarely confront the issues raised 
by procedural due process in the takings context in this Article.158 Thus, from the 
 
158 These factors are respectively the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors of the Texas Boll Weevil test. 
See supra note 119. 
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perspective of a private delegation of eminent domain power, especially as practically 
illustrated in the case studies of Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc. and Texas Medical 
Center in Parts V.A. and B. of this Article, these four factors would appear to be most 
relevant.  
 However, it may be argued that the qualification on one “heavily” weighted 
factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test, concerning a private actor’s pecuniary or personal 
interest, should be amended.  As is evidenced by the two case studies,159 instead of 
qualifying the private delegate’s interest in terms of one “that may conflict with his or her 
[the private actor’s] public function,”160 the qualification should be couched in terms that 
relate to a landowner’s or to a resident’s interest.   
On the other hand, while these four procedurally due process-influenced factors 
may address the two particular delegates and the enabling statutes in the case studies in 
this Article, future statutes may conceivably arise that permit a private actor the right to 
define criminal sanctions if a landowner were to resist the taking of his or her property, 
another of the Texas Boll Weevil factors.161 Therefore, although (1) meaningful 
government oversight of the delegation, (2) an opportunity to be heard by affected 
individuals, (3) an examination of the interests of the private delegate, and (4) an analysis 
of any existing limitations on the private delegate’s power address the current central 
concerns of the procedural due process aspects of existing delegations of eminent domain 
power to private parties, they may not in future delegations of such power.  Thus, for this 
reason alone, the Texas Boll Weevil test is useful because of its comprehensive nature in 
addressing a wide range of issues that may arise through private delegations of any sort 
 
159 See infra Parts V.A. and B. 
160 Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. 
161 This factor is the fifth item in the Texas Boll Weevil test.  See supra Part IV.C.1.a. note 119.   
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of traditional governmental and coercive power, but especially in the eminent domain 
context.  
ii.  The Initial Three-Part Inquiry 
In addition, apart from the eight-factor core of the test, the initial three-part 
inquiry of the Texas Boll Weevil test seems to be unduly laden with particularly unwieldy 
issues when applying it to the private delegation of the takings power.  For instance, the 
first part of the initial three-part inquiry centers on the issue of whether or not there has 
been legislative or law-making power delegated to a private actor.162 This analysis has 
required, in some instances, substantial feats by the Texas Supreme Court to conform a 
particular delegation with nebulous definitions of legislative or law-making power to 
those that impact public policy or engage in rulemaking.163 
A less unwieldy inquiry, especially in the eminent domain arena, may, however, 
be one that centers on determining whether or not a power is traditionally public, 
governmental, and therefore coercive. A coercive power is one that has traditionally been 
exercised by government.164 Delegation of eminent domain power to a private actor 
would, therefore, clearly fit within the confines of this definition.   
Moreover, the second part of the initial three-step test in recent Texas practice has 
often been a needlessly drawn-out examination determining whether or not an actor is 
public or private.165 For instance, in FM Properties and in Proctor, the Texas Supreme 
Court was clear from the outset that delegation to a private actor was at issue.  In Proctor,
162 See supra nn. 112-13.  
163 See FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 873-74 (noting that legislative or law-making power is one that 
impacts public policy or engages in rulemaking, while failing to specify how the particular delegation at 
issue in the case fit into the definition) (citing Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 466-67). 
164 See supra nn. 25-28 & 35.  
165 See supra note 114. 
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power had been delegated to arbitrators that were unaffiliated with state government.166 
In FM Properties, the delegation had been made to private landowners.167 
In Texas Boll Weevil, however, the court appeared to undergo a tortured process- 
of-elimination analysis in determining whether or not the Official Cotton Growers’ Boll 
Weevil Eradication Foundation was a private or a public entity.168 On the one hand, the 
Texas Commissioner of Agriculture had to certify the Foundation, making the 
Foundation appear to be a public actor.  Yet, on the other hand, the court cited the 
following factors to determine that the Foundation was a private actor:  (1)  The 
Foundation was ultimately a private, non-profit organization that had resulted from the 
petitioning of the Commissioner of Agriculture by Texas Cotton Producers, Inc., another 
non-profit that represented growers of cotton,169 (2)  the Foundation’s board members did 
not have to take public oaths of office, (3) the funds collected by the Foundation were 
statutorily outside the scope of state funds, and (4) the funds were not subject to 
governmental procurement and audit requirements.170 While theoretically there may be 
instances in which it may be unclear if a particular entity delegated this power is a private 
or a public agency, this part of the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil inquiry in the 
eminent domain context may be unnecessary, given the limited amount of potentially 
private actors that fall outside the traditional delegates of eminent domain power- 
railroads, public utilities, and private actors of the same ilk.   
 
2.  Scrutinizing and Modifying the Lawrence Test  
 
166 See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 733; see also supra note 128. 
167 See FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 875 (“The City asserts that Section 26.179 delegates legislative power 
to private landowners.  We agree.”). 
168 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470-71 (undertaking the private v. public actor analysis). 
169 See id. at 459 (noting that Texas Cotton Producers, Inc. spurred the creation of the Foundation). 
170 See id. at 470-71. 
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In addition to the Texas Boll Weevil test, Professor Lawrence describes a very 
general two-step judicial analysis that may be applied to private delegations of public 
power and that also squarely confronts the procedural due process concerns inherent in 
these delegations.  The first part of the test essentially asks courts to weigh the interest 
differentials between the public and the private delegate.171 The interests of the public, or 
at least in the eminent domain context, the interests of affected landowners and the 
private actor, will likely exist on a continuum:  those in which they are in full conflict, 
those in which there is no conflict, and those that may fall between these two opposing 
poles.172 
The outcome of the second part of Lawrence’s two-part judicial inquiry is then 
determined by the level of conflicting interest ascertained in the first part of his test.  The 
second part of Lawrence’s test, however, involves a court’s examining whether or not 
there are sufficient statutory procedural safeguards, controls, or mechanisms on a 
particular delegation to a private party.173 For instance, the more conflict of interest there 
is between a private delegate and affected landowners in a takings scenario, the more 
procedural safeguards Lawrence’s test says there should be.  Similarly, a lesser interest 
differential would merit fewer procedural controls on the private actor’s power in the 
enabling delegation statute.174 If there is no conflict of interest, then presumably there 
need be no accountability mechanisms included in the enabling legislation of the 
delegation.   
 The Lawrence test, like the Texas Boll Weevil test, is not one that would permit a 
quick, easy, and determinative analysis of all potential private delegations.  This test 
necessarily implies the courts’ having to make case-by-case inquiries, and perhaps 
 
171 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 685, 695.   
172 See id. at 685. 
173 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 685, 695. 
174 See id. at 685. 
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adjusting the rules and standards and applications over time, thus resulting in a less 
objective test than may be desired.   
 In addition, by hitting at the heart of the procedural due process 
underpinnings of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, that private delegates of public 
power act in a disinterested way that is ensured by statutory accountability mechanisms, 
Lawrence’s suggested two-part inquiry is obviously less unwieldy than its eight-part 
Texas Boll Weevil counterpart.  However, this greater facial efficiency may result in even 
more subjective and unwieldy analyses by courts, given that the latter test forces a court 
to consider any number of potential factors that may arise in a private delegation and to 
answer them forthrightly with an affirmative, negative, or neutral response.  For instance, 
in the Texas Boll Weevil test, the factors centering on whether affected persons are 
represented in a private actor’s decision to use delegated power and the pecuniary or 
personal interest of a private actor, arguably address the self-interested opportunity of a 
private delegation of public power.  Moreover, the portions of the Texas Boll Weevil test 
examining meaningful government review and how narrow the delegation is in “duration, 
extent, and subject matter”175 primarily confront the other main concerns of procedural 
due process:  accountability mechanisms and controls.  Tangentially, other factors of the 
test, including whether or not a private delegate may define criminal acts and whether the 
legislature has provided adequate standards to guide the delegate, also confront this main 
concern of procedural due process.176 
Furthermore, while addressing the core of procedural due process, the first part of 
the Lawrence test may result in an even more subjective inquiry than the Texas Boll 
Weevil inquiry.  There are simply no guidelines or guiding questions, unlike in the Texas 
 
175 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.  These factors represent the first and sixth factor of the Texas 
Boll Weevil inquiry. See supra note 119. 
176 These factors are five and eight of the Texas Boll Weevil test, respectively. See supra note 119. 
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test, that force courts to focus on the nature of the interests (both public and private) and 
the nature and extent of any conflicts between the private actor’s interest and the affected 
landowner in an eminent domain context.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to develop a more 
precise, perhaps more objective test, given the innumerable sets of facts that could arise 
and the varied ways in which legislation that enables delegation could be written.   
 Finally, this Article does not agree with the more flexible approach of the 
second part of the Lawrence inquiry.  This second part matches the safeguards or controls 
to the conflict in interests between a private delegate and affected communities.  As a 
general rule, this paper asserts that there should be a maximum number of accountability 
mechanisms included in enabling legislation of private delegations of eminent domain 
power because of the severely coercive nature of a seizure of an individual’s land, be it a 
home, investment property, or small business.  What precisely this “number” of 
mechanisms is, is again determined on a case-by-case, necessarily subjective inquiry. 
 
D.  An Alternative Approach:  Substantive Due Process 
 
An alternative approach that may be considered when assessing the question of 
whether or not the takings power should be delegated to private, non-profit corporations 
is substantive due process.  Having considered these arguments, this Article ultimately 
finds them more unsatisfactory than those involving procedural due process in affording 
protections to those impacted by the decisions of private, non-profit corporations that use 
delegated eminent domain power.  It has been a settled question of law that property 
rights are classified as economic due process rights, and they are accordingly examined 
under a less-stringent two-pronged test that involves answering the following inquiry:  1) 
44
whether or not there is a legitimate end to the takings power delegation; and 2) whether 
the end is rationally related to the means sought by which to achieve it.177 
Under this standard of analysis, there is little doubt that almost any private 
delegation of the takings power to a private, non-profit corporation would serve a 
legitimate end, given that a state legislature would not delegate such massive power to an 
entity that did not add great value, usually economic, to the state or to its subdivisions.178 
Enhancing or preserving a state’s economic base is certainly a legitimate end.  Secondly, 
there is an argument that this end is rationally related to the delegation by the state to the 
non-profit because it preserves economic and political efficiencies to the non-profit, as 
well as to the government, allowing the non-profit ostensibly to continue to add value to a 
state’s economy.  Indeed, as a practical matter, the rational basis test under which 
economic regulations are examined is one under which most private delegations should 
pass muster.  As Professor Lawrence notes, “almost any delegation will be found to be a 
sensible means of reaching legitimate goals.”179 When faced with the rational-basis test, 
many courts will do almost whatever it takes to keep from striking down an economic 
regulation promulgated by the legislature.180 
On the other hand, a court might not uphold a private delegation of the takings 
power to a non-profit corporation if the rationale for the delegation no longer fit the 
times.181 This question may be important to consider in assessing the following case 
studies, especially that involving the Texas Medical Center.  This delegation was made 
over fifty years ago, and it has never been litigated.182 Notwithstanding this concern, 
 
177 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 678. 
178 See e.g., infra note 216 (quantifying the economic impact of the institutions of the Texas Medical Center 
in Houston, Texas,  in terms of 63,000 additional local jobs and 3.5 billion dollars in medical research 
funding).  
179 Lawrence, supra note 5, at 679.   
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 680.   
182 See infra Part V.B.1. note 217. 
45
however, a substantive due process approach, with its lessened scrutiny of a private 
delegation of the takings power, would simply ignore the more fundamental and 
significant procedural due process inquiry discussed in Parts IV. A. and B. of this Article 
that, at the very least, allows for a more balanced, nuanced approach to all parties 
affected by a private non-profit’s decision to exercise the takings power delegated to it.183 
V.  An Introduction to Two Case Studies in which Eminent Domain Power Has Been 
Delegated to Private, Non-Profit Corporations 
 
The two case studies discussed in this section of this Article are actual examples 
of instances in which the very public power of eminent domain has been delegated to a 
private non-profit or charitable corporation.  Each case study occupies a place on the 
polar extremes of the procedural due process spectrum.   
 
A.  Case Study One: Dudley Neighbors, Inc./Dudley Neighborhood Street Initiative 
 
1.  History 
 
183 On the other hand, other courts and commentators have used a separation of powers analysis to 
undergird PNDD.  For instance, Texas generally analyzes private delegations through a separation of 
powers perspective.  See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 467 (“More commonly, however, Texas has 
rooted its delegation jurisprudence only in the principle of separation of powers.”).  In Proctor v. Andrews, 
972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1998), however, the same court clarified that when a private delegation is at 
issue, the vesting of legislative power in the legislative branch under Article III, Section 1 of the Texas 
Constitution provides the appropriate constitutional  basis for determining whether or not a private 
delegation is averse to the Texas constitution.  The Proctor court noted that Article II, § 1 of the Texas 
Constitution, that constitutionally enshrines separation of powers between the three branches of Texas 
government, is the constitutional foundation by which to assess public delegations of power, such as those 
to government agencies. See supra note 136.  Separation of Powers analysis involves adhering to the 
principle that government as enshrined in the federal and state constitutions is divided into three branches 
(judicial, executive, and legislative) that balance and check one another.  However, when power is 
delegated to a private entity, this power is not placed within this three-tier, overlapping structure.  See 
Reeder, supra note 47, at 219.   In contrast, Lawrence notes that because privately delegated power falls 
outside the realm of the three-branched structure, separation of powers underpinnings for PNDD is 
inapposite. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 665-66. (“Separation of powers may have some relevance to 
delegations of legislative power to executive agencies, in that one department might then in fact be 
exercising the power of another, but a private delegation does not cross the lines between departments.”). 
This Article agrees with Lawrence. But see supra Part IV.D. (confirming the use of separation of powers 
analysis in Texas nondelegation doctrine).  
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Dudley Neighbors, Inc. (DNI), is the eminent domain arm of the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), a Boston, Massachusetts, community group with the 
mission of revitalizing the long-neglected Dudley neighborhood in the Roxbury/North 
Dorchester section of Boston.184 When DSNI was formed in 1984, there were 1,300 
trash-filled empty property lots in the Dudley neighborhood.185 In particular, DNI is a 
non-profit urban community land trust. 186 Its charge has been to use the takings power 
to assemble disparate parcels of primarily vacant land in the Dudley Triangle section of 
the neighborhood to construct affordable housing.187 For instance, in the early 1990’s, 
DNI used eminent domain on 132 vacant parcels of land that were eventually used to 
build 134 affordable-housing units for residents of the neighborhood.188 Subsequently, 
DNI’s eminent domain power has been used to seize land for additional homes, a 
greenhouse for Dudley residents, gardens, and parks.189 
2.  Mechanics of Statutory Due Process Accountability Controls 
 
The relevant Massachusetts enabling statute allows an urban redevelopment 
corporation, including a charitable corporation, to take land by eminent domain, provided 
that certain extensive procedures, ostensibly designed to foment accountability in the 
takings process, are followed.190 Massachusetts courts view urban redevelopment 
corporations, although some may be technically classified as for-profit corporations, as 
 
184 See ON THE GROUND WITH COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, published by The Enterprise 
Foundation (2000), www.practitionerresources.org/cache/documents/ 19319.pdf, p.1. 
185 See THE CATALOGUE FOR PHILANTHROPY,
http://www.catalogueforphilanthropy.org/ma/2005/dudley_street_5605.htm, last visited on July 5, 2006. 
186 See ON THE GROUND WITH COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, published by The Enterprise 
Foundation (2000), www.practitionerresources.org/cache/documents/ 19319.pdf, p.13. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at pp. 13-14. 
189 See THE CATALOGUE FOR PHILANTHROPY,
http://www.catalogueforphilanthropy.org/ma/2005/dudley_street_5605.htm, last visited on July 5, 2006. 
190 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 3, 11 (2006).  
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more akin to public service or charitable corporations because they are designed to 
benefit the public.191 
The first step is that the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) must delegate to 
the DNI the power of eminent domain, a power that has already been delegated to 
BRA.192 Second, DNI, or any other urban redevelopment corporation formed pursuant to 
the statute, must be engaged in revitalizing blighted areas of certain communities in 
Massachusetts.193 Third, before DNI may undertake a project, even before the exercise of 
eminent domain power is contemplated, it must receive approval from both the planning 
board and the city council of the city of Boston, following a public hearing on the 
issue.194 Notice for the public hearing must be published on at least two occasions, no 
earlier than 14 days before the date of a hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation 
and posted in a conspicuous place in Boston.195 The enabling statute then requires that a 
second form of mailed notice be given to all landowners who are within or abut a 
proposed project.196 
In addition, the planning board submits a report, within 45 days of the public 
hearing, that includes an analysis of details such as whether or not the area is blighted and 
how the proposed redevelopment comports with the city’s master plan. 197 The report 
must also include a recommendation to approve or to disapprove a project to the city 
council.198 The city council, in turn, is then charged with submitting a report that 
approves or disapproves a project to the mayor, within 90 days of the public hearing and 
 
191 Opinion of the Justices, 135 N.E.2d 665, 667, 334 Mass. 760, 763 (Mass. 1956).   
192 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 3 (2006); see also the page of DSNI’s website explaining DNI at 
www.dsni.org/dni/, last visited on 07/03/06; ON THE GROUND WITH COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY 
INITIATIVES, published by The Enterprise Foundation (2000), located at 
www.practitionerresources.org/cache/documents/ 19319.pdf, p.13; Taylor, supra note 43, at 1075.  
193 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 3 (2006). 
194 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6 (2006). 
195 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6B (2006). 
196 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6 (2006). 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
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within 45 days of the council’s receipt of the planning board’s report.199 Furthermore, 
both reports must be written and made available to the public, including copies sent by 
certified mail to those individuals who were notified of the public hearing.200 Moreover, 
any person “aggrieved by the approval or disapproval of a project” has 60 days within the 
time that the city council has transmitted its report to the mayor to seek recourse in the 
courts.201 
Another check on the use of eminent domain power by DNI or other urban 
redevelopment corporations in Massachusetts is that a project must provide a means, for 
persons or families who are displaced by the exercise of the power, to be provided in the 
site or in an equivalent area the following three items:  (1)  a place to live that is similar 
in rent to the displaced dwelling, (2)  is “reasonably accessible” to their places of 
employment, and (3)  is safe, decent, and accessible to public utilities, shopping, and 
public transportation.202 A project may not be approved by the planning board or city 
council if contingency plans for displaced families and individuals through the use of 
eminent domain are not included.203 
A final check on the exercise of the takings power by DNI is that once a project is 
approved by the planning board and city council, a certificate is issued to BRA.  BRA 
then makes a third, separate and final determination of a project’s approval.204 
3.  Due Process Accountability Controls in DNI’s and DSNI’s Organizational Structure 
 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6C (2006). 
202 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6 (2006). 
203 See id. 
204 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 3,6 (2006); see also Taylor, supra note 43, at 1076.  
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In addition to the significant statutory due process mechanisms in the enabling 
statute of the DNI, there are a number of other accountability controls in the 
organizational structure of DNI and of its parent organization, DSNI, that serve to 
preserve disinterested aims of procedural due process.  For instance, DNI is governed by 
an 11-member board of directors, six of whom are appointed by DSNI and one each 
appointed by the mayor of Boston, the Roxbury Neighborhood Council, the city council 
member for the district, and the state senator and state house representative for the 
neighborhood.205 DSNI, the parent organization of DNI, is in turn governed by a 29-seat 
board of directors, 14 of whom are residents (both adults and youth) of the Dudley 
neighborhood, with the remaining board members representing seven other non-profit 
agencies, two community churches, two neighborhood businesses, and two community 
development organizations.206 Except for two seats on DSNI’s board of directors, all 
directors are elected by Dudley neighborhood residents.207 
4. Preliminary Analysis of Procedural Due Process Statutory and Organizational Controls 
 
The main concern expressed in this Article with respect to the private delegation 
of the very public eminent domain power to non-profit and charitable corporations is that 
these entities will exercise the takings power in a self-interested manner to the detriment 
and to the exclusion of the public interest.  Opportunities for this manner of exercise are 
ripe for non-profits delegated the takings paper in enabling statutes that do not contain 
certain controls, such as the electoral accountability that exists with respect to the public 
 
205 ON THE GROUND WITH COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, published by The Enterprise 
Foundation (2000), www.practitionerresources.org/cache/documents/ 19319.pdf, p.11. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
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exercise of eminent domain power.208 As applied to DNI, however, this concern is 
significantly downplayed by the wide-ranging accountability mechanisms inherent in the 
enabling statute and in the organizational structures of DNI and DSNI.   
For instance, in the enabling statute for Massachusetts urban redevelopment 
corporations, there is accountability to elected officials for an exercise of eminent domain 
at almost every level of local government.  Indeed, approval for a project must be 
received by the planning board, the city council, and BRA, all public or quasi-public 
entities, that are either directly or indirectly accountable to voters.  Moreover, even 
though a project does not necessarily require the approval of the mayor, he or she 
receives the city council’s recommendation for a particular project.  Therefore, Boston’s 
mayor may ostensibly intervene politically should a particular taking and redevelopment 
project prove sensitive.   
 Furthermore, the statutory process calls for a number of opportunities for the 
public interest to be heard, given that the law requires that there be a joint public hearing 
between the city council and planning boards and that affected property owners be given 
at least three kinds of notice for the hearing.  Also, the process includes an appeal that 
aggrieved property owners may use to have their say in the courts.  Most importantly, 
when it comes to the use of eminent domain power by DNI or similar urban 
redevelopment corporations, the process requires that redevelopment projects may not be 
approved by the planning board if there are no relocation plans for affected residents or 
landowners.   
 These numerous statutory accountability processes in the exercise of eminent 
domain power by DNI serve as checks on the self-interested use of the takings power, 
and they may be juxtaposed to similar accountability mechanisms in the organizational 
 
208 See supra note 92. 
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structure of DNI and DSNI.  For instance, five of DNI’s board of directors are selected by 
elected representatives at all levels of state and local government.  Should these 
representatives approve a taking that is contrary to the Dudley community’s will, then 
presumably the elected officials responsible for their selection may be held accountable 
on Election day.  Furthermore, the remaining six directors of DNI are selected by DSNI, 
of which 27 of its directors are selected by the residents of the Dudley neighborhood and 
of which 14 must be residents of the community.   
These six directors of DNI are therefore held at least indirectly accountable for 
their vote to use eminent domain power by the ostensibly affected residents of its 
exercise.  Organizational controls call for the Dudley community to be in ultimate control 
of the use of eminent domain power by DNI, checks that are in great contrast to the self-
interested use of power that is ripe for abuse in the Texas Medical Center case study.209 
Yet another foundational and historical check on the use of eminent domain 
power by DNI is that its parent organization, DSNI, was borne out of efforts by the 
community, in partnership with a local foundation, to improve the neighborhood.210 
Thus, to the extent that DNI uses its privately delegated takings power, the community-
focused roots of DNSI inform DNI’s actions by essentially forcing it to use its power in 
ways with which the community will agree.  Even though DNI’s actions may be deemed 
self-interested because they benefit the community, they are wholly disinterested because 
one particular person or private party is not benefiting - it is likely the entire Dudley 
neighborhood.   
 
B.  Case Study Two:  The Texas Medical Center (TMC) 
 
209 See infra Part V.B.  
210 See Taylor, supra note 43, at 1078-79.   
52
1.  History 
 
The second case study that this Article will examine is that of the Texas Medical 
Center (TMC) in Houston, Texas.  TMC is a non-profit charitable corporation211 that 
oversees the largest medical complex in the world,212 spans more than 1,000 acres of land 
in the heart of Houston,213 to which over 13 hospitals, two medical schools, four nursing 
schools, with additional schools of dentistry, public health, and pharmacy belong.214 
Although TMC does not itself provide patient care or employ any medical personnel, it 
owns and manages much of the real property and provides maintenance and ancillary 
services, including upkeep of roads, landscaping, and constructing of parking facilities, 
for its 42 member institutions.215 In addition, the member institutions brought 
approximately $3.5 billion in medical research funding to Houston between the years 
2000 and 2004, employed over 63,000 workers in 2004, and had 5.2 million patient visits 
in 2004 alone.216 
TMC was granted the power of eminent domain in 1959.217 It has used its takings 
power on at least one occasion in 2004 to condemn a residential house in an adjacent 
 
211 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 1 (2005). 
212 See http://www.visithoustontexas.com/visitors/fast_facts/, last visited on July 5, 2006. 
213 See http://www.tmc.edu/masterplan/2006/HiRes2006updatev.2.pdf, p.2, last visited on July 5, 2006. 
214 See http://www.tmc.edu/tmc-introduction.html, last visited on July 5, 2006. 
215 See http://www.tmc.edu/tmc-facts.html, last visited on July 5, 2006.; see also 
http://www.guidestar.org/pqShowGsReport.do?np. oID+14224, last visited on July 11, 2006.    
216 See http://www.tmc.edu/tmc-facts.html, last visited on July 5, 2006.   
217 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 (2005).  Although the statute does not mention TMC by name, 
the description of the non-profit charitable corporation contained in the statute matches that of TMC.  For 
instance, section one of the statute notes that “[a]ny nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of 
this state for purely charitable purposes and which is directly affiliated or associated with a medical center 
having a medical school recognized by the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American 
Medical Association as an integral part of its establishment, and which has for a purpose of its 
incorporation the provision or support of medical facilities or services for the use and benefit of the public, 
and which is situated in any county of this state having a population in excess of six hundred thousand 
(600,000) inhabitants according to the most recent Federal Census shall have the power of eminent domain 
and condemnation . . . .”  TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 1 (2005). 
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neighborhood as part of a plan to construct a five-story, approximately 500-space parking 
garage on land previously occupied by houses in a residential neighborhood.218 
2.  Mechanics of Statutory and Organizational Due Process Controls 
 
In comparison to the statutory due process controls and accountability 
mechanisms of the previous case study, DNI, TMC has very little restrictions or 
accountability mechanisms on its takings power.  Indeed, sections two and four of the 
Texas enabling statute allow TMC “full authority and [eminent domain] power” “for the 
purpose of acquiring lands adjacent to or contiguous (whether or not separated by public 
thoroughfares)” to it for the construction, maintenance, and operation of “facilities 
dedicated to medical care, teaching, and research for the public welfare, including 
ancillary or service activities generally and customarily recognized as essential to such 
facilities in a medical center.”219 In addition, sections three and four of the statute permit 
TMC to use its taking power to transfer title or to lease property acquired through 
eminent domain to any “nonprofit corporation, association, foundation, or trust” for 99 
years with a renewal option.220 
218 See Texas Medical Center v. Joe Alfred Izen, Jr. & City of Houston, Texas, No. 814.303 (Harris County 
Ct. Aug. 13, 2004) (noting that the county commissioners’ award to TMC assessed the value of the seized 
real property at $80,000 in the condemnation proceeding).  In the interest of full disclosure, the Author 
notes that the taking of this real property occurred in her neighborhood and the plan and eventual 
construction of the parking garage in violation of private deed restrictions was vigorously protested by the 
Central City Preservation Coalition, the arm of the neighborhood homeowner’s association designed to 
protest the construction and taking.  The author was Vice-Chair of this organization.  For Texas legislative 
hearings regarding the neighborhood’s protests, See Texas House Bill 2537 in the Land and 
Resource Management Committee (during the 79th Regular  
Session), http://www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/committee79/50421p25.ram 
Representative Garnet Coleman's, the Texas House of Representatives member who aided the Central City 
Preservation Coalition, exchange with Rep. Beverley Wooley on Texas Senate Bill 62, regarding 
limitations on eminent domain, on the  
floor of the Texas House is at 1:10:10 in: 
http://www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/chamber79/081005a.ram In addition, as a result of  these protests in the 
Author’s neighborhood, a city-wide civic group, Citizens Against Eminent Domain Abuse, was formed, of 
which the Author is Chair.   
219 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 §§ 2,4 (2005). 
220 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 §§ 3,4 (2005). 
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There do, however, appear to be three statutory restrictions on TMC’s takings 
power.  First, section five of the law notes that should TMC acquire property through 
eminent domain and choose not to use the acquired land “for the purpose of medical care, 
teaching, or research or essential ancillary and service activities,” then title to the seized 
property will revert to the original owner or to his or her “heirs, devisees, or assigns.”221 
Second, section six of the enabling statute, a recent amendment to it, requires that before 
TMC begins the takings process or records title to acquired real property, it must provide 
“written notice by certified mail” to each recorded landowner of property for each parcel 
of land that it “seeks to acquire or purchase; or that is not more than 200 feet from any 
boundary of any unit of real property.” 222 The intended use of the property, whether it is 
seized through eminent domain or purchased outright, must not comport with deed 
restrictions.223 Third, the statute mandates that should TMC exercise its takings power, 
then a condemnation hearing must be held in which three special county commissioners 
award damages and costs to an aggrieved landowner for his or her property.224 However, 
once TMC pays the damages and costs to a landowner, deposits this money with the 
court, and executes a bond, then it may take possession of the seized property.225 
With respect to the issue of accountability restrictions in TMC’s organizational 
structure, in contrast to DNI and DSNI, there is no direct or indirect accountability to the 
electorate or populations affected by a taking of land.  Indeed, TMC is a privately-run 
 
221 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 5 (2005). 
222 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 6 (2005).  Deed restrictions are private contractual limitations on 
the use of real property that run with the land, commonly found on parcels of land located in established 
neighborhoods in Houston, Texas.  Because the city of Houston does not have zoning requirements that 
restrict the use of land by city ordinance, many neighborhoods rely on deed restrictions to ensure that the 
residential character of lots in neighborhoods is preserved.  
223 See id. 
224 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 6(a) (2005) and TEX. PROP. CODE. § 21.021(a) (2005); see also 
supra note 89. 
225 See TEX. PROP. CODE. § 21.021(a) (2005). 
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non-profit organization with a privately-appointed board of directors that remains largely 
anonymous to the public and to the electorate.226 
3.  Preliminary Analysis of Procedural Due Process Accountability Mechanisms 
 
The statutory restrictions on TMC’s eminent domain power are minimal at best, 
especially in comparison to those of the first case study, DNI.  In addition, the controls 
resist a due process appellation.  For instance, the reversion interest to the original 
landowner that is mandated if TMC does not use land seized by eminent domain for 
medical care, teaching, research, or ancillary or service purposes,227 comprehends little of 
the “disinterested” concerns inherent in procedural due process.  The reversion of land 
occurs only after 1) the taking has taken place and 2) the passage of time has elapsed to 
indicate that TMC will not use the acquired land in accordance with the statutorily 
mandated restriction on its use.  Therefore, TMC may still fundamentally exercise the 
public power of eminent domain in a self-interested way, until it chooses not to use the 
property for a particular purpose.  Nonetheless, this statutorily mandated purpose may in 
itself be deemed self-defeating, given that there is no time restriction included in the 
statute as to when reversion may take place, once TMC has failed to comply with the 
purpose of the seized land.   
Does reversion take place after 30 days, months, years, etc.?  Therefore, what 
accountability mechanisms may have been contemplated in the statute with respect to 
reversion are negated by the lack of a time requirement regarding when a purpose is 
unfulfilled and when reversion must occur.    
 
226 For instance, information on board members is publicly unavailable on guidestar.org, a public interest 
website that tracks non-profit organizations and lists the board members of many non-profit organizations.  
See http://www.guidestar.org/pqShowGsReport.do?np. oID+14224, last visited on July 11, 2006. 
227 See supra note 221. 
56
Moreover, the notice requirements in the statute that become effective once TMC 
decides to pursue condemnation or even to purchase real property for an intended use that 
does not accord with private deed restrictions,228 are helpful in that they alert surrounding 
landowners, as well as the owner of targeted property, to potentially incompatible uses of 
real property.  The notice requirements may also help neighborhoods and individuals to  
mount and to mobilize a potential political solution to the use of eminent domain or the 
purchase of real property by TMC.  While this recent amendment to the TMC enabling 
statute may be considered welcome relief to landowners in an area targeted for exercise 
of eminent domain power, the fact remains that while TMC may give notice, it may also 
ultimately exercise its delegated right to eminent domain, regardless of the interests of a 
neighboring community.  Thus, this notice restriction does not address the underlying 
procedural due process concern of disinterested action found in TMC’s private exercise 
of eminent domain power.   
 In addition, the third statutory restriction on TMC’s use of the takings power, 
regarding the mandate that a condemnation hearing be held and three commissioners be 
appointed to assess the value of the land taken by TMC,229 is similarly unavailing.  At the 
point that a condemnation hearing is held, the only purpose of the proceeding and 
appointment of the commissioners is to determine the compensation that should be 
awarded a landowner whose property has been seized.230 This hearing does not 
contemplate the constitutional question of whether or not TMC, as a private actor, should 
have been delegated the extremely public power of eminent domain, without more 
forceful accountability and due process mechanisms.231 
228 See supra note 222. 
229 See supra nn. 218, 224.  
230 See supra Part III.B., nn. 89-90, 218. 
231 See supra nn. 218, 224. 
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Further, the TMC enabling statute includes two instances in which general 
procedural due process concerns such as the disinterested exercise of the takings power 
are effectively circumscribed.  For instance, the statute authorizes that TMC may exercise 
eminent domain power for ancillary or service purposes related to medical care, teaching, 
and/or research.232 However, the statute does not include any statutory limitations or 
definitions of what constitutes an ancillary or service purpose that would merit the use of 
eminent domain.  Therefore, because these terms remain undefined, arguably any 
arbitrary or self-interested purpose on the part of TMC could be used to justify the 
organization’s exercise of eminent domain.  These arbitrary or self-interested purposes 
could ostensibly include parking or recreational facilities in a particular area in which 
TMC was able to acquire real property at relatively low market rates, such as what 
happened in the TMC’s most recent exercise of eminent domain.233 These acquisitions 
are in comparison to alternative sites with potentially higher costs but lower indices of 
social and public disruption.  
 Moreover, the enabling statute arguably allows TMC to be a virtual property Pac-
Man, gobbling up land, via the takings power, that is ever contiguous or adjacent to its 
previously acquired property.234 Therefore, as the non-profit attains property, either 
through outright purchase of land through negotiations with a landowner or through use 
of the coercive power of eminent domain, real estate next to this property is then at risk 
or is under statutory threat of being seized.  The effect of this statutory permissiveness is 
to provide TMC with almost blank-check authority to exercise or to threaten to exercise 
eminent domain powers on land that is located near any of its property, regardless of the 
location of the land, how it is currently being used, and future plans for its use by TMC.   
 
232 See supra note 219. 
233 See supra note 218. 
234 See supra note 219.  
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Finally, even if TMC does not use its power of eminent domain delegated to it by 
the Texas legislature, by virtue of its having the power under the enabling statute, private 
property covenants restricting the use of the land, or deed restrictions, acquired by TMC 
are effectively extinguished.235 The effect of this statutory permissiveness, therefore, 
appears to be just the sort that potentially provides a breeding ground for opportunities by 
private non-profit actors to use the mere threat of eminent domain authority in self-
interested ways and that ignores the interests of the larger public and community.     
 
C.  Application of the Modified Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence Tests to DNI and TMC  
 
1.  DNI 
 
a.  Application of the Texas Boll Weevil Test to DNI 
 
Under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, DNI, the Boston-based, private, non-
profit corporation delegated the power of eminent domain that was introduced in Part V. 
A. of this Article, would pass with flying colors.  For instance, the analysis under the 
modified Texas test for private delegations of eminent domain power proposed in this 
Article begins with an initial two-part inquiry as to (1)  whether or not traditionally 
governmental, coercive powers, i.e. public powers, have been delegated, and (2)  whether 
or not these public powers have been delegated to a private entity that rests outside the 
traditional constitutional categories of private entities delegated the power of eminent 
domain, such as railroads companies and public utilities.  As applied here, by virtue of its 
being delegated the power of eminent domain, a traditionally governmental power that is 
 
235 See Letter from Robert B. Neblett III of Jackson Walker L.L.P. to Andrew Icken, Executive Vice 
President of TMC (Jan. 21, 2005), (“At your request we have set forth below a legal explanation of how the 
Texas Medical Center’s (“TMC”) acquisition of real property located within the Central City subdivision of 
Houston (the “Property”) has extinguished any applicable deed restrictions. . . . Furthermore, the fact that 
some of the Property was acquired by purchase, instead of condemnation, does not affect the outcome.  The 
deed restrictions are nonetheless terminated by TMC’s acquisition.”) in reference to the private deed 
restrictions in the Houston neighborhood in which TMC exercised the takings power delegated to it to build 
a parking garage prohibited by the restrictions; see also supra note 218.   
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coercive because it can force a landowner to relinquish her real property irrespective of 
her wishes, DNI has accordingly been delegated a public power.  Secondly, DNI is not a 
railroad, public utility, or other company that would fall within the traditional permissible 
private eminent domain categories - it is a private, non-profit company, albeit with a 
sizeable community influence over it.  
The next step in the application of the modified eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test 
to DNI is an analysis pursuant to the following factors:236 (1)  whether or not there is 
meaningful government review of a private delegate’s actions by “a state agency or other 
branch of state government,” (2)  whether or not individuals who are affected by the 
delegate’s actions have adequate representation in the delegate’s “decision making 
process,”  (3)  assessing the private delegate’s economic and/or personal interest, and (4) 
analyzing whether or not the delegation is “narrow in duration, extent, and subject 
matter.”237 
With respect to the issue of whether or not there is meaningful government review 
as applied to DNI, it is apparent that this factor weighs in favor of the delegation of the 
takings power to DNI.  The Massachusetts enabling statute allows for at least five levels 
of government review by a state agency or other branch of state government.238 For 
instance, both the city council and the planning board must approve a project of DNI, 
encompassing two levels of review by state government.239 BRA, the delegating entity of 
eminent domain power to DNI, must then perform a tertiary review of the project and 
then approve or disapprove it.240 Fourth, with respect to the specific use of eminent 
 
236 See supra Part IV. C.1.d.i. (advocating a limitation of the Texas Boll Weevil test to these four factors, 
respectively factors one, two, four, and six of the original Texas Boll Weevil test, but also recognizing that 
this limitation may not address the particularities of divers enabling legislation that delegate the takings 
power to private entities).   
237 See supra note 158.  
238 See supra Part IV.A.2., nn. 192-99. 
239 See supra nn. 197-99. 
240 See supra note 204. 
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domain power by DNI, the Massachusetts enabling statute requires that unless reasonable 
contingency plans are made by DNI for any residents displaced by eminent domain, then 
the city council and the planning board may not approve the redevelopment project.241 
Finally, a fifth level of direct government review is that anyone, within 60 days of the 
city council’s having approved or disapproved a project in its report to the mayor, has the 
statutory right to seek review by the state courts.242 
Not only, however, does the enabling legislation for DNI and similarly situated 
community development corporations in Massachusetts allow for multiple levels of 
government review by a number of branches and offices of government, but also the 
particular organizational structure of DNI’s board of directors serves as an indirect source 
of government review on the takings plans of DNI.  For instance, four out of the eleven 
board members of DNI are selected by the mayor, city council representative, state house 
representative, and state senate representative for the Dudley neighborhood.243 Hence, if 
a particular taking proves controversial, then the members of DNI’s board appointed by 
elected officials, presumably before approving a project, would likely vote in a manner 
not inconsistent with electoral forces, allowing these officials to stay in elected office.  
Therefore, the five levels of direct government review by varied branches and offices, in 
addition to the indirect government review by a number of different elected offices, 
ensure that the meaningful government review portion of the modified Texas Boll Weevil 
test is satisfied.  
Moreover, with respect to the issue of whether or not affected persons by a private 
delegate’s actions are adequately represented in the delegate’s decision-making process, 
it appears that this inquiry similarly satisfies notions of procedural due process in four 
 
241 See supra nn. 202-203.  
242 See supra note 201. 
243 See supra Part V.A.3., note 205.   
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ways.  Three of these ways are direct, and one is indirect. First, the enabling state statute 
requires that two types of notice be sent to any landowner whose land is adjacent to a 
project not more than 14 days in advance of the joint public hearing of the city council 
and planning board.244 Second, the landowners have an opportunity, in advance of a 
project’s approval by the city council and the planning board, to voice their concerns and 
to be heard before the decision-makers.  Third, the fact that contingency plans must be 
erected for any resident affected by a project that involves the taking of land, necessarily 
implies that affected residents have a say in a project that involves eminent domain, if 
only to communicate how they might be impacted.245 Fourth, an indirect way in which 
affected persons are represented in DNI’s decision-making process is that Dudley 
neighborhood residents, whether or not landowners, essentially elect six out of DNI’s 
eleven directors.246 Neighborhood residents elect the vast majority of the directors of 
DNCI, which then chooses six of DNI’s board members.247 Therefore, because affected 
landowners and residents of any takings power that DNI may exercise have four levels of 
representation, this element of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test also weighs in favor of 
the delegation of the takings power to DNI.    
With respect to the part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test that addresses the 
private delegate’s economic or personal interest regarding the exercise of the takings 
power, it is similarly apparent that this factor also weighs in favor of the delegation of 
eminent domain power to DNI.  In DNI, the interests of it and the community at large, 
including landowners and residents, are intertwined.  For example, DNI’s stated charge, 
which then necessarily guides its interest, is to assemble and to develop vacant land 
parcels in the Dudley neighborhood of Boston, for the purpose of primarily constructing 
 
244 See supra nn. 195-96. 
245 See supra nn. 202-03. 
246 See supra  nn. 205-207. 
247 See id. 
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affordable housing for its residents.248 Indeed, the Massachusetts enabling statute 
mandates that DNI have revitalization at the core of its mission.249 Therefore, while DNI 
may arguably have a self-interested motive to achieve its core mission, this mission and 
interest is inherently guided and tempered by the community.  Thus, there is little conflict 
with DNI’s interest and the larger interest of the Dudley neighborhood.   
An analysis of whether or not the delegation is narrow in scope also responds 
favorably to the delegation of the takings power to DNI.  For instance, while there is no 
technical limit on the duration of the eminent domain power of DNI, presumably there is 
a practical limit on it, given that there is only a certain amount of land that may be 
revitalized in the neighborhood.  Moreover, DNI’s power is statutorily limited by BRA’s 
delegation of eminent domain power to it.250 BRA could presumably revoke the power 
that it has delegated once DNI’s mission of revitalizing the neighborhood has been 
accomplished.  In addition, DNI is limited to exercising eminent domain power within 
the confines of the Dudley neighborhood, and it can only act to use this power in 
revitalizing the area.  Consequently, DNI is limited in content and subject matter, and this 
fourth element weighs in favor of the delegation.   
While recognizing that the previously discussed four elements of the modified 
Texas Boll Weevil test are likely most important with respect to the delegation of eminent 
domain power to private, non-profit actors, this Article is also cognizant that other 
elements of the original eight-part Texas test may be invoked in any number of statutes 
that delegate the takings power to these non-traditional private actors of eminent 
domain.251 Therefore, for purposes of being as comprehensive as possible, this Article 
 
248 See supra note 187. 
249 See supra note 193. 
250 See supra note 192. 
251 See supra Part IV.C.1.d.i. 
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will also undertake analysis of DNI pursuant to the remaining elements of the original 
Texas Boll Weevil test.  
 First, with respect to the element of the original test encompassing whether or not 
the “private delegate’s power is limited to making rules” or simply applying the law to 
particular individuals,252 it would appear that this element is inconclusive as applied to 
DNI and eminent domain power.  DNI’s delegation involves neither making rules nor its 
applying the law to certain persons.  Second, the inquiry weighs in favor of the delegation 
because DNI does not have the power to define criminal acts or to impose criminal 
sanctions, another element of the original Texas test.  Third, the Texas test similarly 
weighs in favor of DNI’s delegation of the takings power, as DNI was specifically 
created to assemble vacant land for the DSNI using eminent domain authority, and 
arguably it has special qualifications to exercise the power.253 Finally, with respect to the 
element of whether or not the legislature has provided adequate standards to the private 
delegate in the original Texas test, the Massachusetts legislature and BRA directly and 
indirectly have provided standards that guide DNI in the exercise of its taking power.  For 
example, they have mandated that DNI’s takings power may only be exercised for the 
revitalization of the Dudley neighborhood and that any exercise of the takings power that 
impinges on residents be counter-balanced with contingency plans for them.254 
b. Application of the Lawrence Test to DNI 
 
As applied to a modified form of the Lawrence test, the delegation of eminent 
domain power to DNI similarly passes constitutional muster for purposes of procedural 
 
252 See supra note 119. 
253 See supra note 187. 
254 See supra nn. 192-93 & 202-03. 
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due process.  For example, the first part of the Lawrence inquiry examines the nature and 
extent of any conflicts of interest between the private delegate and the public, or at least 
those persons affected by the delegate’s choice to exercise its delegation.255 For the 
reasons outlined in Part V.C.1. above, it is apparent that there is very little conflict-of-
interest  between DNI, when it chooses to exercise its statutorily delegated eminent 
domain power, and affected persons, primarily residents and landowners of the Dudley 
neighborhood. 
Moreover, under the modified version of the Lawrence test advocated in this 
Article, that notes that there must be the maximum number of safeguards possible on a 
private delegate,256 there are a number of accountability mechanisms on DNI’s exercise 
of the takings power from a procedural due process perspective.  These controls include 
the amount of input and approval that elected officials have on the exercise of this public 
power, to the almost equivalent amount that the Dudley community at large has. 
 
2.  TMC 
 
a.  Applying the Modified Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC   
 
The first two parts of the initial three-part inquiry of the modified Texas Boll 
Weevil test certainly arrive at the conclusion that TMC is a non-profit charitable 
corporation, as it is a clear private actor that has been delegated the very public power of 
eminent domain.257 In addition, under the modified eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, the 
result is one that weighs against the delegation of the takings power to TMC in the 
 
255 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
256 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
257 See supra Part V.B. nn. 211-217. 
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current version of the enabling statute under procedural due process principles.  
Therefore, in comparison to the DNI case study, TMC appears to occupy the opposite end 
of the procedural due process spectrum.     
For example, under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, there is little, if any, 
meaningful government review of an exercise of eminent domain power by TMC.258 
While the enabling statute permits an aggrieved landowner to have a formal hearing 
about the contested parcel of land, this hearing is simply to assess the value of the 
property by three commissioners appointed by the county.259 Its purpose is not to afford 
procedural due process in the sense of constitutionally contesting TMC’s disinterest in 
the exercise of the takings power and accountability controls that favor this disinterest.260 
Other than this hearing by the judicial branch, however, no other branch of government, 
state agency, or branch of municipal or county government has the power to review an 
exercise of eminent domain power by TMC.   
This lack of governmental oversight is even more telling, given that even when 
TMC acquires property though direct purchase, any deed restrictions, or contractual 
restrictions on the use of land that run with the land are extinguished, simply by virtue of 
this private, non-profit’s eminent domain power.261 Thus, that TMC’s power is hardly 
subject to government review, much less meaningful review, appears to weigh “heavily” 
against the delegation of eminent domain power to it, much like the result of the 
application of this element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test to private landowners 
delegated the power to control water quality in FM Properties.262 In addition, this result 
 
258 See supra Parts V.B.2. and V.B.3.  
259 See supra nn. 225 & 229-230. 
260 See id. 
261 See supra note 235. 
262 See supra nn. 144-46 (for an analysis of the application of the original Texas Boll Weevil test in FM 
Properties). 
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is in marked contrast to that found with respect to DNI, a delegation that includes copious 
amounts of direct and indirect meaningful government review.263 
Moreover, under the modified version of the Texas Boll Weevil test, the issue of 
whether or not affected persons by a taking are adequately represented in the process to 
seize the property, similarly weighs against the delegation to TMC.  While affected 
persons in the DNI case study, both landowners and residents, are seemingly represented 
to a large extent and exert influence in a decision by DNI to use the takings power, 
persons affected by a similar decision by TMC have little or no representation.264 
Arguably, however, the recent amendment to the Texas enabling legislation that 
mandates that affected landowners be notified via certified mail, should the organization 
purchase or acquire property through eminent domain for a purpose that would not 
comport with private deed restrictions, is a step in the direction of providing affected 
persons more representation in the decision-making process.265 For instance, this notice 
would ostensibly permit aggrieved parties, who may be affected either by the taking of 
land or a use of land that is incompatible with its historical use and current surroundings 
of the property, to use political activism to compel representation and perhaps influence 
in TMC’s decision-making process.  On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a 
community could accomplish this aim, and there is no certainty attached to its results, 
unlike with the Massachusetts enabling legislation.  Therefore, this element of the revised 
Texas test weighs against the delegation of eminent domain power to TMC.   
The portion of the modified Texas test examining whether or not the private 
delegate has a pecuniary or personal interest in the exercise of eminent domain power, 
also results in an unconstitutional delegation of the takings power pursuant to federal 
 
263 See supra Part V.C.1.a.  
264 See supra Parts V.B.2. and V.B.3. 
265 See supra note 222. 
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procedural due process notions.  For instance, unlike DNI, a private, non-profit 
corporation that is heavily rooted in the community and is controlled to a large extent by 
the residents of the Dudley neighborhood, TMC’s organizational structure as a non-profit 
land management and parking concern to its member institutions inherently serves to 
create a clash of interest with communities.  This conflict of interests is only enhanced by 
the fact that TMC’s board of directors is hidden from view and is unaffiliated with 
affected communities.    
 Proof of this clash is found in the sole instance in which TMC used eminent 
domain and outright purchase to acquire real property in a Houston-area neighborhood to 
construct a multi-level parking garage.  This parking facility was prohibited under the 
covenants that limited land use in the neighborhood to residential, single-family 
homes.266 Furthermore, despite the fact that the organization used its power of eminent 
domain for only one parcel of land,267 and acquired the other parcels of land for the 
parking garage through outright purchase, TMC still “used” its eminent domain power to 
automatically extinguish the private land covenants, or deed restrictions, on the 
purchased parcels that restricted the use of the property.268 Thus, as in FM Properties,
this clash of interests between not only TMC and a targeted landowner, but also a 
surrounding community, weighs “heavily” against the delegation of power.269 
The final part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test in the eminent domain 
context involves assessing whether or not the private delegation is limited in “duration, 
extent, and subject matter.”270 As applied to TMC, this element similarly weighs against 
the delegation of eminent domain power to it.  For instance, the enabling statute permits 
 
266 See supra note 218. 
267 See id. 
268 See supra note 235. 
269 See supra nn. 144-46 (explaining the application of the original Texas Boll Weevil test in FM 
Properties). 
270 See supra note 119 (referencing the sixth factor of the original Texas test). 
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TMC to acquire property through eminent domain and therefore to extinguish private 
deed restrictions in adjacent communities in perpetuity.  There is little restriction on when 
TMC’s delegated power of eminent domain terminates.271 The sole limitation on any 
duration of TMC’s exercise of the takings power occurs after the power has been 
exercised, in which real property will revert to the original owner if the entity does not 
use it for the purposes designated in the enabling statute.272 Furthermore, in contrast to 
the larger purpose of revitalizing the Dudley neighborhood for which DNI may use 
seized land, the purposes for which TMC may use taken land are extremely broad.  These 
purposes also do not necessarily fit within a larger goal of community development.  
They range from the building of medical facilities used for teaching, research, and patient 
care purposes to ancillary or service purposes such as parking, a garbage dump, or even 
attractive landscaping.273 
Moreover, TMC is authorized to use its statutorily delegated takings power on 
any real property that is adjacent to or contiguous to its existing property, however the 
property was acquired.274 Thus, the use of eminent domain power to acquire one parcel 
of property would then justify the exercise of the takings power on adjacent land sites, 
permitting a seemingly endless use of eminent domain and infringement upon applicable 
land covenants.  Therefore, in stark divergence from the delegation of eminent domain 
power to DNI, that limits an exercise of the power to the Dudley neighborhood as long as  
BRA permits and for revitalization purposes only,275 the duration, extent, and subject 
matter of TMC’s delegation is extremely broad in scope and weighs against the 
delegation under procedural due process principles.  Thus, all four elements of the 
 
271 See supra Parts V.B.2. and V.B.3. 
272 See supra note 221. 
273 See supra nn. 215 & 218-19. 
274 See supra note 219. 
275 See supra Part V.C.1.a. 
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modified Texas test weigh against the constitutionality of the delegation of eminent 
domain power to TMC, including two that weigh “heavily” against the delegation under 
the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in FM Properties. 
b.  Applying the Original Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC  
 
Even under a more comprehensive approach of an application of the Texas test, 
encompassing the remaining elements of the original Texas Boll Weevil test, the 
delegation of eminent domain power to TMC still violates basic notions of procedural 
due process.  For instance, while TMC, in its application of the takings power, does not 
make rules or apply the law to particular to particular individuals, it also is not 
empowered to define criminal acts or to impose criminal sanctions on recalcitrant 
landowners, two elements, respectively, of the original test.276 Thus, the delegation 
weighs in favor of the delegation on the latter factor.  On the other hand, it is also 
apparent that TMC is not specially qualified or trained to exercise eminent domain 
power,277 given that its primary role is as a land management company, not purveyor of 
eminent domain power, in contrast to DNI.  Furthermore, the Texas legislature provided 
little, if any standards that would guide a more disinterested use of eminent domain 
power by TMC, another element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test.278 Combining 
these results with those of the application of the modified test, a numerical tally indicates 
that a majority of the factors weighs against the delegation of the takings power. 
 
c.  Applying the Lawrence Test to TMC 
 
276 These are the third and fifth factors, respectively, of the original Texas Boll Weevil test. See supra note 
119. 
277 This element references the seventh element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test. See supra note 119. 
278 This element refers to the eighth factor of the Texas test.  See supra note 119.  
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Under a modified Lawrence test, for all of the reasons noted in the application of 
the modified version of the Texas Boll Weevil test in Part V.C.2.a. above, it is clear that a 
large gap exists between the interests of TMC and affected landowners and residents in 
the non-profit’s exercise of eminent domain power.279 Moreover, given the large interest 
differential between TMC and surrounding communities and landowners, and the 
correspondingly few number of statutory safeguards included in the Texas enabling 
legislation, especially in relation to the Massachusetts enabling legislation for DNI, there 
are not an appropriate amount of safeguards included in the Texas legislation.   
 
VI.  Statutory Solutions  
A.  A Range of Proposals 
 
As exemplified by the TMC case study, the coercive nature of delegated eminent 
domain power increases the opportunities for abuse and self-interested action in the hands 
of private delegates operating under little or no accountability mechanisms.  Short of 
advocating a per se rule against the delegation of eminent domain power to private, non-
profit and charitable corporations, this Article proposes a number of solutions that 
legislatures may use to increase public accountability, lessen self-interested action, and 
mandate that private, non-profit corporations delegated the takings power comport more 
forcefully with fundamental notions of procedural due process and of representative 
democracy.   In addition, this Article advocates taking a more comprehensive approach to 
these statutory solutions, ensuring that a number of accountability safeguards are 
included in legislation, as in the Massachusetts/DNI case study, rather than just a single 
 
279 See id. & nn. 244-46. 
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safeguard.  It is also important to remember that, some legislatures, upon a re-visiting of 
existing legislation or legislative proposals, may simply forgo a delegation at all, given 
the ramifications under procedural due process.   
First, an obvious statutory solution is one that is included in the enabling 
legislation for the DNI case study, as well as suggested by the amended and original 
versions of the Texas Boll Weevil test.  This solution involves inclusion of statutory 
provisions that mandate that an exercise of eminent domain by a private charitable 
corporation be approved by a state agency, a state legislature, or even several offices of 
local government.  The preference, however, is that officials who are directly elected by 
the voting populace must approve a takings exercise.280 For instance, in the case of DNI, 
a development project must be approved by three levels of local government: (1) the 
Boston city council, (2) the city’s planning board, and (3) BRA.    
Furthermore, the idea of ensuring that a private actor’s taking power is submitted 
for a review by a governmental office is not unheard of.  Indeed, when public utilities or 
railroads that have been delegated the takings power chooses to exercise it, they must 
often seek approval from a branch of state government.281 In addition, the provisions 
allowing for an official who is directly elected to approve an exercise of the takings 
power by a private, charitable corporation serve as further assurance that the private 
delegate will not take arbitrary, self-interested action that is unaccounted for.    
A second legislative solution is to include a damages provision in the enabling 
legislation of the delegation for an affected landowner or resident that is harmed by an 
 
280 In Virginia, for example, the Jamestown-Yorktown foundation, a public foundation created by the state 
to preserve the historical quarters of the original Jamestown settlement, has the power of eminent domain in 
order to take property that would advance its historical mission, but any exercise of the eminent domain 
power must be approved by the governor, a directly elected official, VA. CODE ANN. § 23-288 (2006). 
281 See e.g., note 50 (noting the requirement for state agency approval for an exercise of the takings power 
by a public utility); see also Lawrence, supra note 5, at 686 (discussing that “. . . but many states have 
imposed additional procedural requirements on private condemners alone.  Frequently statutes require 
private condemners to secure the approval of a state agency before initiating the condemnation action, and 
the agency may investigate the particular project quite closely to assure that it furthers the public interest.”). 
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exercise of the takings power by a non-profit corporation.282 This largely economic 
remedy would go above and beyond any compensation paid to landowners for the value 
of their seized land, and in the case of business owners, could include the loss of goodwill 
and business losses.  The damages could also extend to affected residents, who may not 
be landowners, but who are residential or commercial leaseholders.  Similarly, damages 
could be extended to individuals in a community who are affected by a private, non-profit 
corporation’s incompatible use of seized land in an area.283 A third approach is to 
mandate standard procedures, such as public hearings to which affected parties such as 
landowners, residents, community groups, and representatives of the private, non-profit 
corporation would be invited and given reasonable time and notice to air their views 
publicly.  The mandate of public hearings would ostensibly accompany any delegation of 
eminent domain power to a private charitable actor, and they could be held directly 
before an elected body that will approve or disapprove an exercise of the takings 
delegation, such as in the DNI case study.  Hearings could also be conducted before an 
advisory body or state agency that will provide recommendations for action to elected 
officials who must provide final approval of an exercise of the takings power.  
Moreover, not only could these hearings be used to air potentially opposing points 
of view related to a private non-profit’s exercise of eminent domain power, but also they 
could be used to evaluate and to provide oversight of the charitable corporation’s actions 
with respect to ways in which it has dealt with affected persons in the community and for 
its plans for the seized land.  An example of this sort of oversight is found in the DNI 
case study, in which contingency plans for residents and landowners affected by DNI’s 
 
282 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 691-92 (noting that “[o]ccasionally, a damages remedy might be a 
safeguard.”); see also Professor Linda Crane, John Marshall University School of Law, Address in 
response to this Paper at the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship 
Conference (Jun. 3, 2006).   
283 See e.g.,  supra note 218. 
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use of eminent domain must be included in order for the city council and planning board 
to approve a revitalization project.  Nonetheless, both types of hearings would likely add 
a veneer of fairness to an exercise of the takings power by a private non-profit 
corporation, especially one that is governed by a board of directors that is shielded from 
public scrutiny, such as in the TMC case study.   
 Still a fourth statutory solution that would counter-balance the effects of private 
board of directors’ discussions and meetings that are largely held out of public view and 
that are related to the exercise of eminent domain power by a private, non-profit is one 
that would mandate that these meetings be subject to a state’s Open Records or Open 
Meetings Acts.284 This type of statutory provision may allow elected officials who must 
approve a private exercise of eminent domain power, as well as persons affected by its 
exercise, to evaluate fully the consequences and justifications of the exercise.   
In keeping with this fourth recommended solution, a fifth proposal is to ensure 
that the delegation is subject to a state’s Sunset Act, in which there would be a time cap 
placed on the exercise of the takings power of perhaps five to ten years.285 This type of 
provision specifically addresses whether or not the private actor’s actions are limited in 
duration.286 
Yet a sixth solution is to include in enabling legislation that the exercise of the 
takings power be subject to a state’s equivalent of the Administrative Procedure Act.287 
This sort of statutory provision would treat private, charitable corporations in an 
equivalent manner to state agencies that also exercise public, coercive powers, injecting a 
level of substantive and procedural fairness into a non-profit’s exercise of the takings 
 
284 See Reeder, supra note 47, at 220. 
285 See id. 
286 This concern addresses the sixth factor of the original Texas Boll Weevil test.  See supra note 119. 
287 See id. 
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power.  It would also have the effect of mandating consistent, proven procedures in an 
exercise of eminent domain power.  
 
B.  Social Capital Impact Assessments (SCIAs):  Opening Up The Process 
 
A seventh legislative solution is to require that private, non-profits perform a 
Social Capital Impact Assessment (SCIA), a study that would evaluate the impact of the 
exercise of the takings power on a community.288 The idea of SCIAs largely derives 
from Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), that are mandated in the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in response to any action by a federal agency that may 
have a significant impact on the environment.289 A draft EIS must be made available to 
the public early enough in the deliberative process in order for the public to comment 
meaningfully on an agency’s decision.290 An agency must then respond to the public’s 
comments in a final EIS.291 
Although criticized for being too time-consuming, expensive, and unduly 
procedurally-oriented,292 the EIS process has been highly successful in opening up the 
decision-making process of federal agencies to previously disempowered community and 
 
288 See Asmara Tekle Johnson, Desperate Cities:  Eminent Domain and Economic Development in a Post-
Kelo World, 16 CORNELL J. LAW & PUBLIC POL’Y ____ (2006) (proposing the implementation of Social 
Capital Impact Assessments when eminent domain is used for economic development purposes in order to 
provide increased public transparency and accountability to these decisions). 
289 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). 
290 See Jeannette MacMillan, Note, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in Domestic Environmental 
Law:  NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks (Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 494 (2005); see also Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2006) 
(requiring that once an agency decides that it will undertake an EIS and before it publishes a draft EIS, it must 
publish a Notice of Intent that provides public participation in determining the “scope” of the EIS and significant 
issues related to it), and Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2006) (inviting comments by 
the public and other agencies). 
291 Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (2006) (requiring that the lead agency respond to 
the public’s comments); see also Brian Cole et al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the United States:  
New and Improved Environmental Impact Assessment or Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
1153, 1162 (2004). 
292 See MacMillan, supra note 290, at 521; see also Cole, supra note 291, at 1163 & 1169 (noting that EISs can 
cost several hundred thousand to several million dollars and may take an average of one or two years, if not 
longer, to complete).   
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environmental groups concerning determinations of these agencies that may significantly 
impact the physical environment.293 Indeed, EISs have been instrumental in forcing the 
redesign, reconsideration, or even withdrawal of decisions of federal agencies that 
severely impact the environment.294 The result has been to provide a framework for 
public debate concerning environmental decision-making that previously was non-
existent.295 
In the eminent domain arena, SCIAs have been recommended as a way to involve 
and to empower oft-neglected community groups and individuals who are impacted by 
economic development takings using a similar process to EISs in the 
environmental/NEPA context.296 SCIAs could be mandated either through enabling 
legislation or through the courts.  They would assess the social impact of an economic 
development taking on a community by compelling the response of a governmental entity 
and its private partners to 14 questions that address community concerns.  These studies 
would also be provided to the public early enough for reasonable notice and comment by 
the public.  Therefore, the idea is that, as in the environmental context, economic 
development takings would similarly be opened up.297 The relevant 14 questions are as 
follows:   
1. How will the taking or development project disrupt 
existing land uses?; 
 
293 See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205, 207 (1998); see also MacMillan, supra note 290, at 529.   
294 See Caldwell, supra note 293, at 207.  For instance, the EIS process was instrumental in halting projects that 
affected old-growth forests and the northern spotted owl.  See Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements 
and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis,  
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf at 2 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005) (citing 
Mark Bonnet & Mark Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation:  The Endangered Species Act and the Northern 
Spotted Owl, ECOLOGY L.Q. 105-71 (1991), and Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (D. Wash. 
1988) (halting attempts to log the habitat of the northern spotted owl after it was declared a threatened species by 
the Fish & Wildlife Service)). 
295 See Johnson, supra note 288, at ____. 
296 See id., supra note 288 at _____. 
297 See id. 
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2. How will the taking or development affect 
neighborhood integrity?; 
 
3. Will the taking or revitalization project displace and 
relocate homes, families, and businesses?;  
 
4. What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or 
project?; 
 
5. If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the 
taking or revitalization project is to displace homes, 
families, and businesses, how can these effects be 
mitigated?; 
 
6. If displacement and relocation identified in 
Question Three occur, how many homes, families, and 
businesses will be relocated?; 
 
7. If displacement and relocation occur, how many 
opportunities will there be for displaced residents to occupy 
space in the new development as a home or as a small 
business?;298 
8. If there is no plan to have displaced residents 
occupy space in the new development as a home or as a 
small business, what proposals do the relevant government 
entities have to relocate residents or small business owners 
to an equivalent site?; 
 
9. What is the economic impact of the displacement of 
these homes, families, and businesses on the city and 
state’s purse, in the form of lost real property and sales 
taxes, jobs generated by small businesses that may be 
displaced, and revenues generated by these businesses?; 
 
10. What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the 
families who may be displaced?; 
 
11. What is the promised economic impact of the 
takings, in terms of employment opportunities and tax 
revenue gained?;   
 
12. Is the promised economic impact referred to in 
Question Eleven realistic and practical, in light of other 
potentially uncontrollable factors, such as the availability of 
financing for the project, key tenants and institutions that 
 
298 Housing provisions in the new development plan for some of the displaced residents in Berman were 
specifically noted by the Court in that case.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31. At least one-third of the new residential 
units were to be “low-rent housing with a maximum rent of $17 per room per month.” Id. 
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may occupy the project, or the economic health of these 
key tenants?;  
 
13. What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand to 
gain from the economic development project have with any 
state or local governments exercising eminent domain or 
promulgating legislation in support of its exercise?; and 
 
14. What alternatives exist to placing the economic 
development project in the proposed site?299 
There is no reason, however, that SCIAs could not be expanded to go beyond 
economic development takings and to provide a global statutory solution to takings in 
general, especially those by private, non-profit actors delegated this power.  Statutorily 
implemented SCIAs would likely address the legislative or due process concerns of 
PNDD and the Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence tests by essentially injecting public input 
and a measure of accountability into the takings decisions of private non-profit delegates. 
For instance, in the NEPA/environmental arena, EISs are often made available to public 
officials for their public comments.300 By mandating that SCIAs concerning a private, 
non-profit entity’s use of its delegated takings power be provided to pertinent elected 
officials, and subsequently providing a forum for officials to respond and to comment on 
a non-profit’s proposed action, affected communities would be afforded a golden 
opportunity to determine their representatives’ stance on a proposed taking.  
Communities could then subsequently decide their agreement with this stance on Election 
day.   At a minimum, however, this Article recommends that SCIAs be included as part 
of the “record” before elected officials or before advisory groups to elected officials that 
have final say over a non-profit’s exercise of the takings power.  
 
299 Johnson, supra note 288, at _____. 





In an era in which many services are privatized by government, from prisons to 
war, it is no surprise that the privatization movement would inevitably extend to the 
traditionally governmental, very public and coercive power of eminent domain.  Having 
escaped the harsh scrutiny that followed the Court’s Kelo decision and that upheld 
economic development takings that benefit for-profit private parties, takings by private, 
non-profit and charitable corporations merit, however, equal concern.  These entities 
often operate in the shadows of governmental and electoral oversight and are largely 
governed by privately shielded boards of directors.   
This Article advocates that the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, a doctrine that 
remains alive and well in state courts, and that is based upon fundamental notions of 
procedural due process and of representative democracy, provides an excellent basis for 
assessing the exercise of the takings power by private, non-profit corporations.  The 
version of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine supported in this paper suggests that 
private, non-profit actors with coercive power, such as the takings power, should be 
required to act in a disinterested manner through a number of proposed accountability 
mechanisms, including holding elected officials accountable for the takings decisions of 
these entities.   
Moreover, the Doctrine is embodied in two tests that are discussed and ultimately 
modified in this Article for use in non-traditional private delegations of eminent domain 
power.  These tests include the Texas Boll Weevil case used by the Texas Supreme Court 
to evaluate private delegations of power, as well as one proposed by Professor David 
Lawrence.  Both tests, however, highlight the importance of accountability measures and 
disinterested action by a private delegate, the two underlying concerns related to 
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procedural due process and American representative democracy in the Private Non-
Delegation Doctrine.   
Using the original and modified versions of the Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence 
tests, two case studies of private, non-profit and charitable corporations delegated 
eminent domain power, the Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc. in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and the Texas Medical Center in Houston, Texas, are examined.  Analysis 
of these case studies reveals that they occupy opposite poles of the Private Non-
Delegation continuum from a procedural due process perspective.   
To address the procedural due process concerns stressed by the Private Non-
Delegation Doctrine and the need for appropriate accountability safeguards and 
mechanisms, this Article advocates seven legislative solutions that may be included in 
enabling legislation for these types of delegation.  Short of establishing a per se rule 
against the delegation of eminent domain to private, non-profit corporations, these 
solutions, in a time where privatization is a popular panacea for a number of ills, may 
provide a cure to the pinctures of procedural due process that may result when the very 
public power of eminent domain is delegated to private, non-profit corporations.     
 
